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According to statistical reports, in June 2018 the word Bitcoin was the 54th most 
searched keyword on Google1, while in 2017, it was the second most-searched global news 
term.2 Cryptocurrency community is experiencing a boom of attention and it is not reaching 
only a narrow group of enthusiasts anymore. More importantly, the attention is increasingly 
drawn towards the underlying technology of blockchain and its potential utilization without 
limitation to the financial sector solely. The technological development was largely left 
unchecked for the most part of the decade since its introduction in 2008, however, over the 
last couple of years and with unexpected spikes of value of cryptocurrencies and security 
scandals, the attention of national regulators has been sparked and the global discussion as to 
where in the legal system we should place blockchain and cryptocurrencies has begun. Upon 
discovering that the European Commission was launching a blockchain observatory program3 
and study4, I decided to base my master thesis on the topic of blockchain technology within 
the EU regulatory framework. My main motivation was to explore a new and largely 
undiscovered area of modern technology from the legal point of view. Due to its complexity 
and many differing approaches of national jurisdictions, I considered the assessment at the 
European level and internal market as the best and most useful approach for conducting a 
complex analysis. For this purpose I used legal analysis and comparative methods. 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a basic overview of how the technology works and 
all major areas where the deployment of blockchain might be subject to already established 
regulatory requirements. Given the short and revolutionary history of the blockchain 
technology, there are only scarce literature and source materials available. Most of the 
undertaken assessments are either of highly technical nature, or focus on a narrow scope of 
blockchain’s features or relating legal fields. This thesis, therefore, seeks to implement the 
                                                 
 
1 R. Hudgens, ‘The 100 Most Popular Google Keywords [Infographic]’ (2018), available at: https://www.siegemedia.com/seo/most-popular-
keywords, last accessed 17.8.2018. 
2 J. Koetsier, ‘Bitcoin Is The Second Most-Searched Global News Term Of 2017’ (2018), available at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2017/12/13/bitcoin-is-the-second-most-searched-global-news-term-of-2017/, last accessed 
17.8.2018.  
3 See ‘EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum’ (2018), available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-blockchain-observatory-
and-forum, last accessed 17.8.2018.  
4 See ‘Study on opportunity and feasibility of a EU blockchain infrastructure’ (2017), available at:  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-





particular aspects of legal research into a coherent and comprehensive outline which might 
serve as a first step for necessary further research on the legal side of decentralized ledgers. 
As I am very interested in this topic, I would like to conduct more research in the future, in 
order to be able to assess the presented legal concerns and fields in more depth and, 
simultaneously, to provide thorough legal assessment in other areas of blockchain 
development which could not be included in this master’s thesis, namely, e.g. in the public 
sector for eGovernment purposes or supply chains.  
This master’s thesis is divided into four chapters. The first Chapter provides an 
introduction of EU primary law in respect of the EU’s competence to act in the area of 
blockchain technology. Then, basic description of blockchain technology is laid down in 
Chapter two, while more detailed and technical information is included in Annexes I - IV of 
this master thesis. Subsequently, in Chapter three, regard is given to cryptocurrencies and 
smart contracts and their potential utilization concepts and solutions. Lastly, Chapter four 
assess ten particularly interesting aspects of blockchain technology which, under certain 
circumstances, might be viewed as advantages or potential issues that need to be overcome for 







“I am pro-technology that improves the lives of many people in any way possible, and I think 
the blockchain has the potential to do that.” 
Melanie Swan 
 
“It will take time for the idea of decentralized trust through computation to become a part of 
mainstream consciousness, and until then, the idea creates cognitive dissonance for those 




1. EU Competence in Respect of Blockchain Technology 
The EU was established by the Member States with the intention to fulfill the 
envisioned goals such as monetary and customs union, free movement of goods, services, 
persons and capital, common policies in e.g. agricultural sector, cooperation in judicial affairs, 
etc.5 Thus, the EU can only act on the basis and within the limits of powers and competences6 
attributed to it by the sovereign Member States.7 The so-called principle of conferral has been 
one of the fundamentals of the European integration from the beginning.8 Currently, it is 
enshrined in Article 5(1) of the TEU and further defined in Article 5(2) of the TEU: “Under 
the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.” 
Per this principle, every legal document of the EU has to have a legal basis; otherwise, it 
would be an act ultra vires, i.e. beyond the limits of attributed competence.  
                                                 
 
5 See K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuffel, R. Bray, N. Cambien, European Union Law (3rd ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2011), p. 106-111. 
6 While some national jurisdictions differ between the notion of power and competence (e.g. the Czech Republic), the EU law generally does 
not distinguish between the two; therefore, this thesis will hereinafter understand the notion competence as encompassing the term power as 
well. See P. Svoboda, Úvod do evropského práva (5th ed., C.H. Beck 2013), p. 46. 
7 M. Tomášek, V. Týč and coll., Právo Evropské unie (2nd ed., Leges 2017), p. 147; P. Craig, G. de Búrca, EU law: text, cases, and materials 
(6th ed., Oxford University press, 2015), p. 74; K. D. Borchardt, The ABC of EU law (6th ed., EU Publications Office 2011), p. 38, H. C. H. 
Hofmann, ‘General principles of EU law and EU administrative law’ in C. Barnad, S. Peers (eds), European Union Law (2nd ed., Oxford 
University Press 2017), p. 197-198; R. Shütze, European Union Law (1st ed., Cambridge University Press 2015), p. 224-225. 
8 M. Tomášek, V. Týč, op. cit. no. 7, p. 147-150; L. TIchý, R. Arnold, J. Zemánek, R. Král, T. Dumbrovský, Evropské právo (5th ed., C. H. 





Nevertheless, the delimitation of competence limits and consequently, the particular 
legal basis is not always clear.9 For this reason, the legal theory distinguishes between three 
types of the EU competence: (i) expressly attributed competence, (ii) implicitly attributed 
competence and (iii) subsidiary/supplementary competence.10 While the CJEU does not step 
in to define EU’s competence and its limitations very often, an example of such definition of 
limitation might be the Tobacco Advertising case11 where the Court held that the 
interpretation of Article 114 (then 95) of the TFEU cannot be extended so as to allow any 
action on the EU level, solely based on the internal market pretense.12 
The first group encompasses all instances when the treaties expressly authorize the EU 
(and/or any of its institutions) to carry out a specified task. 13 Articles 3 to 6 of the TFEU 
serve as an example. Implicitly attributed are the competences which are reasonably necessary 
for the exercise of an expressly attributed competence14, i.e. all competences that are 
enshrined within but not explicitly enumerated in the treaties. A usually provided example is 
the external competence of the EU which might be necessary if the matter requires 
international negotiation and agreement.15 In the pre-Lisbon era, the principle of implied 
international competence was set down by the CJEU’s ERTA doctrine16 and following case 
law. While the doctrine was subsequently codified in Article 5(2) TFEU, there is presently 
still considerable discussion as to the scope of its interpretation.17 Finally, the notion of 
subsidiary competence refers to situations when the treaties only set forth specific goals which 
should be achieved within the Union, however, they do not stipulate the EU’s competence. In 
                                                 
 
9 K. Lenaerts and coll., op. cit. no. 5, p. 113-117. 
10 P.Svoboda, op. cit. no. 6, p. 51-52; K. Lenaerts and coll., op. cit. no. 5, p. 122-123. 
11 Case-380/03 Germany v European Parliament and Council [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:772. 
12 See also P. Craig, G. de Búrca, op. cit. no. 7, p. 76; J. Snell, The internal market and the philosophies of market integration in C. Barnard, 
S. Peers (eds), op. cit. no. 7, p. 317-319. 
13 P. Svoboda, op. cit. no 6, p. 54; L. Tichý and coll., op. cit. 8, p. 74; K. Lenaerts and coll., op. cit. no.5, p. 113. 
14 M. Tomášek, op. cit. no. 8, p. 149; P. Craig and G.de Búrca, op. cit. no. 7, p. 76; K. Lenaerts and coll., op. cit. no. 5, p. 120-121. 
15 P. Svoboda, op. cit. no. 6, p. 54-55. 
16 The ERTA doctrine follows from the CJEU’s judgment Case C-22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECLI:EU:C:1971:32. See also T. 
Verellen, ‘The ERTA Doctrine in the Post-Lisbon Era: Note under Judgment in Commission v Council (C-114/12) and Opinion 1/13’ (2015), 
21 Colum. J. Eur. L. 383, [online] last accessed 17.8. 2018; M. Hodun, Doctrine of Implied Powers as a Judicial Tool to Build Federal 
Policies. 
17 The discussion namely relates to notion of “largely covered area” and was stirred once more with CJEU’s partially contradicting 
approaches which might be observed namely in its reasoning in C-114/12 Neighboring rights [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2151 and in CJEU, 





order to overcome such gaps, Article 352(3) of the TFEU provides for a blanket authorization 
of EU institutions.18 
The second categorization of EU competences is based on the extent and nature of the 
competence, i.e. the amount of competence that is transferred from the Member States to the 
EU. Firstly, in the exhaustive list of specified areas, the EU has the exclusive competence, i.e. 
in such areas, the EU is the primary actor and Member States can only adopt legal acts if 
specifically authorized or instructed by the EU.19 The areas of Union’s exclusive competence 
are enumerated in Article 3 TFEU as follows: (i) customs union; (ii) competition; (iii) 
monetary policy for eurozone members; (iv) conservation of marine biological resources 
under the common fisheries policy; (v) common commercial policy and (vi) conclusion of 
international agreements relating to areas of EU’s exclusive competence.  
Secondly, in a majority of areas the EU has a so-called shared competence with 
Member States which can be either pre-emptive (Member States can adopt legally binding 
acts only in areas where the EU decided not to or ceased to continue exercising competence20, 
thus, respective competences of Member States and the EU exclude one another), or non-pre-
emptive (EU’s competence cannot prevent Member States from exercising their competence 
in the particular matter, e.g. humanitarian aid or research). The non-exhaustive list of shared 
competences is provided in Article 4 TFEU and it includes e.g. internal market, consumer 
protection, area of freedom, security and justice, etc. The primary instrument of shared 
competence is harmonization under Article 114 TFEU21. At this point it should be 
emphasized that the borderline between exclusive and shared competence can in some cases 
be particularly blurry. For instance, taking the customs union as a representative of the 
exclusive competence and the internal market as matter falling within shared competence, “it 
may be difficult to decide whether a case is concerned with the customs union, tariffs, quotas, 
and the like, or whether it is really ‘about’ discriminatory taxation. There can in addition be 
                                                 
 
18M. Tomášek and coll., op. cit. no. 8, p. 149-150; P. Svoboda, op. cit. no. 6, p. 55, P. Craig and G. de Búrca, op. cit. no. 7, p. 91-93, R. 
Schutze, op. cit. no. 7, p. 231-234; L. Tichý and coll., op. cit. no. 8, p. 75-76; K. Lenaerts and coll., op. cit. no. 5, p. 122-123. 
19 K. Lenaerts and coll., op. cit. no. 5, p. 124-127; P. Craig and G. de Búrca, op. cit. no. 7, p.78; M. Tomášek and coll, op. cit. no. 8, p. 154; 
R. Schütze, op. cit. no. 7, p. 237-238. 
20 P. Craig and G. de Búrca, op. cit. no. 7; p. 84; K. Lenaerts and coll., op. cit. no 5, p. 127-130. 





disputes as to whether an act falls within common commercial policy or the internal 
market.”22 
Last type of competence distribution is the supporting, coordinating, or supplementary 
action which allows the EU to only assist Member States when exercising their primary 
competence, thus excluding harmonization23. The included areas are specified in Article 5 
TFEU and they include e.g. health sector, tourism or education matters.24 
Apart from the above established scope, the Member States are the sole bearers of 
competence (so-called retained power), such as citizenship rules, security or direct taxation; 
however, when exercising their retained powers Member States are obliged to act in 
compliance with the EU law25 and principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) 
TEU26. 
Together with the conferral principle, the subsidiarity principle enshrined in Article 5(3) 
TEU and proportionality principle embedded in Article 5(4) TEU should also be taken into 
account when exercising competence within the EU territory27. Adherence to the subsidiarity 
principle is monitored mainly by national parliaments and requires the EU to act within areas 
of shared competence solely if the envisioned goal can be better attained at the EU level.28 
The proportionality principle consists of two parts which should be attained by every legal act 
adopted on the EU territory: the legal act must be appropriate for the intended objective, and 
necessary, i.e. there are no other instruments which could achieve the objective.29 Therefore, 
while the subsidiarity principle applies only in the areas of shared competence, proportionality 
principle is applicable to exclusive and coordinating competenceS as well. 
As follows from the assessment in this thesis below, blockchain technology is not easy 
to categorize in terms of appropriate regulation and consequently, the exercise of competence, 
especially in respect of cryptocurrency. Given the individual secondary legislation that has 
                                                 
 
22 P. Craig and G. de Búrca, op. cit. no. 7, p. 79. 
23 P. Craig and G. de Búrca, op. cit. no. 7, p. 86; M. Tomášek and coll., op. cit. no. 8, p. 156: Specific type of coordinating action relates to 
coordination of economic and employment policies under Article 5 TFEU. See also R. Schütze, op. cit. no. 7, p. 241-243. 
24 P. Craig and G. de Búrca, op. cit. no. 7, p. 86. 
25 P. Svoboda, op. cit. no. 6, p.58, P. Craig and G. de Búrca, op. cit. no. 7, p. 86. 
26 H. C. H. Hofman , op. cit. no. 7, p. 197-198; K. Lenaerts and coll., op. cit. no. 5, p. 147-155. 
27 M. Tomášek and coll., op. cit. no. 8, p. 157-158. 
28 P. Craig and G. de Búrca, op. cit. no. 7, p. 96, 97; L. Tichý and coll., op. cit. 8, p.74-75; K. Lenaerts and coll., op. cit. no. 5, p. 131-140. 





been considered and in some instances already applied to cryptocurrencies and other 
blockchain technology, it follows that they are likely based in shared competence, particularly 
the internal market which aims at establishment and promotion of four freedoms of movement 
– pertaining to goods, services, persons and capital.30 
Provided that cryptocurrency is qualified as a payment instrument or a financial 
instrument for investment purposes, it would be subject to the free movement of capital and 
payments under Articles 63 – 66 TFEU. While the notion of capital is not defined in the EU 
primary law, the CJEU has provided some guidance in this matter and stated that investment 
instruments and securities do fall within its scope.31 As follows from section 3.1.1 of this 
master thesis, the EU institutions have refused to accept cryptocurrencies as means of 
payment and instead, refer to it as means of exchange. However, they have considered that in 
some cases, especially in terms of ICO, cryptocurrencies may qualify as financial instruments 
and thus capital. 
There are particularly two issues which might pose obstacles. First concern relates to 
any regulation of blockchain at the EU level – if adopted, it might lead to de facto extension 
of EU law to a global range due to the decentralized nature of blockchain and possible global 
distribution of nodes within the network. This will be crucial namely with respect to capital 
and payments, as the freedom of movement encompasses movements to third countries.32 
Secondly, cryptocurrencies might be difficult to balance in terms of competence, as the free 
movement of capital might clash with monetary policy of eurozone, should one of eurozone 
Member States accept a cryptocurrency as a legal tender.33 An ECB representative has 
expressed doubts in the past stating that only euro can be accepted as legal tender within the 
eurozone. In this regard, a regulation on the EU level, including legal qualification and 
delimitation of competences might be appropriate to prevent potential conflicts. 
                                                 
 
30 See e.g. L. Tichý and coll., op.cit. no. 8, p. 320-328; K. Lenaerts and coll., op. cit. no. 5, p. 202-204. 
31 See J. Snell, op. cit. no. 12, p.447-449; M. Tomášek and coll., op. cit. no. 8, p. 239-240; L. Flynn, Free movement of capital in C. Barnard 
and S. Peers (eds), op. cit. no. 7, p.448-452; R. Schütze, op. cit. no. 7, p. 659-660. 
32 See J. Snell op. cit. no. 12, p. 449, 454-456; M. Tomášek and coll., op. cit. no. 8, p. 239-240; L. Flynn, op. ci. No. 31, p. 454-456. 
33 See K. Darrah, ‘Estonia pushes ahead in race to issue first state-backed cryptocurrency’ (2018), available at: 
https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/estonia-pushes-ahead-in-race-to-issue-first-state-backed-cryptocurrency, last accessed 17. 8. 2017. In 
relation to the legal tender, within the eurozone, the closest Member State to a state-backed cryptocurrency, and potentially a crypto legal 





Blockchain-based currency and related payment services can also potentially qualify as 
services falling under the Articles 56 – 62 of the TFEU.34 Especially complicated will be the 
determination of providers of such services35, given the decentralized nature of the blockchain 
network. In the event that financial institutions opt for some form of blockchain technology 
and cryptocurrency, which might be the case especially with respect to closed/permissioned 
blockchains, the providers using this technology might also wish to enjoy the freedom of 
establishment under Articles 49 – 55 of the TFEU.36 
Finally, cryptocurrencies might also be categorized as commodity which would namely 
entail application of Articles 28 of the TFEU and following provisions ensuring free 
movement of goods.37 As cryptocurrencies might share some aspects with commodities, 
especially gold, prohibition of import and export restrictions under Articles 34 and 35 TFEU 
would also be applicable, however, it is not entirely clear whether such restrictions would 
even be technically feasible due to the decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies and the fact 
that they do not respect geographical borders. 
It follows that unless the EU considers blockchain and cryptocurrency a matter falling 
in the scope of monetary policy of eurozone or common commercial policy, which are both 
unlikely, the blockchain technology will be a matter of shared, and likely pre-emptive, 
competence. In accordance with section 3.1.1 of this thesis, it also follows from the approach 
of the EU institutions which do not seem to express the view that harmonization, let alone 
unified regulation on the basis of exclusive competence is necessary. Such conclusion, 
however, is dependent on the fact that no (eurozone) Member State, so far, has tried to claim a 
cryptocurrency as its legal tender. Given the additional layers which could be built on top of 
blockchain and cryptocurrency level, such as smart contracts and decentralized applications, it 
should also be noted that the presented conclusion might differ; the assessment of applicable 
primary and secondary provisions will be subject to the particular purpose and use of 
blockchain technology and related instruments (e.g. in respect of intellectual rights, see 
section 3.2.4 of this thesis).  
                                                 
 
34 See J. Snell, op. cit. no. 12, p. 450-452; M. Tomášek and coll., op. cit. no. 8, p. 218-221; C. Barnard, J. Snell, Free movement of legal 
persons and the provision of services in C. Barnard and S. Peers (eds), op. cit. no. 7, p. 408-412. 
35 See M. Tomášek and coll., op. cit. no. 8, p. 221. 
36 See J. Snell, op. cit. no. 12, p. 450-452; M. Tomášek and coll., op. cit. no. 8, p. 231-234; C. Barnard, J. Snell, op. cit. no. 34, p. 404-407. 





2. What is Blockchain and How Does It Work? 
Blockchain is a new type of information technology38, essentially consisting in a 
decentralized trustless and transparent public ledger which records any and all transactions 
validated by pre-defined consensus among computers participating in the ledger. Many 
consider blockchain as the new tier Internet39, in the sense that it provides for a new way of 
network connection and potential interoperability, allowing open and censor-free access to 
information to everyone.  
Public ledgers are nothing new; humanity has found use for them long before the first 
computer was invented. Their fundamental purpose is keeping track of information that the 
society deems important or valuable, namely an individual’s rights and/or obligations. Over 
time, public databases were put in place to record ownership and asset transactions, to register 
corporations, patents or even domain names. With each public ledger a particular renowned 
institution was entrusted with its maintenance. Every transaction, i.e. every change of the 
record had to be wired through this trusted institution in order to ensure the integrity and 
accuracy of the recorded data. The reason for this is commonly referred to as the Byzantine 
General’s Problem40 which describes a situation where multiple independent persons do not 
trust each other, nevertheless, must communicate and cooperate towards a common goal. So 
far, the only way to effectively eliminate possible “treasonous” attacks aiming to disrupt and 
prevent consensus among independent entities – the generals, has been to cooperate via an 
independent and generally trusted third person, i.e. a bank, a state body or another kind of 
institution charged with control and coordination.  
Blockchain may eliminate the need for the trusted intermediary. As a decentralized 
network based on asymmetric cryptography, blockchain ledger is comprised of equal nodes 
                                                 
 
38 M. Swan, Blockchain: Blueprint for a New Economy (1st ed., O’Reilly Media, 2015), p. 92. 
39 Ibid, p. X; A. Wright, P. de Filippi, ‘Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia’ (2015), SSRN [online] 
available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664, p. 18-19, last accessed 19.8.2018. 
40 A. Wright, P. de Filippi, op. cit. no. 39, p. 6: „This problem questioned how distributed computer systems could reach consensus without 
relying on a central authority, in such a way that the network of computers could resist an attack from ill-intentioned actors. It posits that 
three divisions of the Byzantine army are camped outside an enemy city in hopes of conquering it. An independent general commands each 
division and, in order to plan an attack, they need to decide upon a common course of action. Yet, the generals can only communicate with 
one another through a messenger, and there is a traitor in the group who is actively trying to prevent the generals from reaching an 







which, while using different methods of validation, verify and approve transactions, record 
them in a block of transactions and subsequently add the block to the chain in exchange for a 
reward. To be registered in the ledger of transactions, the transaction needs to be firstly 
accepted as true and validated by a pre-defined number of remaining nodes of the network. 
The transaction is true or legitimate, if e.g. “the request comes from the authorized person, the 
house seller has not already sold the house, and the buyer has not already spent the money41”. 
For this determination, two major mathematical methods have been developed – the proof-of-
work and proof-of-stake.  
After the transaction is recorded in the ledger, it is permanent. Unless some 
unpredictable and unusual circumstances arise, such as a hacker attack, the data can never be 
amended or erased from the blockchain ledger. All other nodes in the network use the updated 
version of the blockchain for verification of new transactions which makes the ledger 
transparent. Based on blockchain technology, two persons living in different parts of the 
world who have never met and do not even know each other’s names and other information, 
can safely trade and transfer monetary value in exchange of delivery of goods and services, or 
any other kind of transaction, without having to rely on any intermediary or centralized 
institution, e.g. a bank or PayPal. For detailed information relating to the technical features of 
blockchain transactions, see Annex I. - Detailed Description of Blockchain Technology of 
this thesis. 
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Figure 1 below shows differences between possible network structures. 
Figure 1: Virtual Currencies Have Varied Authority Structures 
 
Source: J. Baron, A. O’Mahony, D. Manheim, C. Dion-Schwarz, National implications of Virtual 






3. Fields of Application of Blockchain Technology on the European 
Market 
3.1. Cryptocurrencies and Financial Services 
The idea of a decentralized trustless record of transaction information which is shared 
by everyone was brought forward for the first time in connection with digital currency by 
Satoshi Nakamoto in his paper from 2008, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System42. 
The mystery behind the author is yet to be solved, even though it is now generally assumed 
that Satoshi Nakamoto serves as a pseudonym for a group of program developers who 
brought forth a “blue print” and manual for establishing a digital transaction system with its 
own digital currency, independent of any of the so-called fiat currencies, such as US dollar or 
euro. As every cryptocurrency, the Bitcoin is based on a blockchain public ledger serving as a 
platform for running of the Bitcoin protocol where all transactions are recorded for future 
public inspection. The protocol is essentially software which enables a system for transferring 
digital cash over the blockchain ledger from one person to another.43 The third layer of 
Bitcoin is the currency itself, often shortened as BTC. While Bitcoin has its own blockchain 
and protocol, some other cryptocurrencies, or alt-coins (i.e. “alternative coins”) run on 
another currency’s blockchain and/or protocol. For example, the Counterparty cryptocurrency 
uses the Bitcoin blockchain ledger which means that all transactions in Counterparty are 
recorded in the Bitcoin blockchain44. This is similar to incorporation of side chains which are 
also denominated in the currency of the parent blockchain (see section 4.5.4 of this thesis). 
Due to the fact that Bitcoin was the first successful cryptocurrency project, and so far, is 
the most widely accepted and used cryptocurrency, the following description of how the 
crypto transactions are made is based on the Bitcoin system. 
New Bitcoins are generated via so-called mining process during which new transactions 
are verified and confirmed (see Annex I. - Detailed Description of Blockchain Technology 
and Annex II. - Cryptocurrencies and Financial Services). Bitcoin and other similar 
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cryptocurrencies have been compared to gold standard45, as similarly to gold46 new Bitcoins 
have to be “mined” and the supply is not unlimited, as there is no centralized institution, such 
as a central bank, which would be charged with monetary policy and issuance of new 
currency. Subsequently, the supply is capped at approximately 21 million of Bitcoins. The 
Bitcoin protocol was written in such a way that the maximum amount is to be reached by 
214047. Nonetheless, the pace with which Bitcoins are mined is decreasing, thus, already 
almost 17 million Bitcoin units have been mined so far.  
Particularly due to the fact that Bitcoin is in some ways similar to gold and its supply 
cannot be adjusted in case of economic difficulties, consequences such as deflation effects 
must be taken into account and might be at the root of the question of volatility48 (see section 
4.8 of this thesis). However, it should be emphasized that not all cryptocurrencies have a 
limited and fixed supply of tokens of value. For instance, Dogecoin does not have a limited 
amount, while Peercoins amount is flexible – there is a stipulated maximum of 2 billion 
tokens but if reached, new ones can be issued, as the main focus is maintaining annual 
inflation rate at 1 %.49 
One Bitcoin unit consists of subunits called mBTC and Satoshis. The current value of 
one Bitcoin is roughly USD 6.5 thousand50 and the whole Bitcoin market cap is estimated at 
around USD 110 billion51. The volatility of cryptocurrencies has been discussed many times 
and is subject of section 4.8 of this thesis. For details, especially in regard to merchant and 
user solutions for acceptance of cryptocurrency, see Annex II. - Cryptocurrencies and 
Financial Services. For information regarding the Ripple protocol, as a representative of 
semi-centralized cryptocurrency, see Annex III. – Ripple. 
                                                 
 
45 M. Štika, ‘Má naprosto svobodná virtuální měna bitcoin místo v právním státě?’ (2017), Bulletin advokacie 5/2018 [online] last accessed 
19.8.2018, pp. 29-34; J. Baron, A. O’Mahony, D. Manheim, C. Dion-Schwarz, National implications of Virtual Currency (1st ed., RAND 
Corporation 2015), p. 8; T. I. Kiviat, ‘Beyond Bitcoin Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions’ (2015), 65 Duke L. J. 569, [online] last 
accessed 18.2.2018, p. 583.  
46 ECB, ‘Virtual Currency Schemes’ (2012), p. 13: Even though cryptocurrencies, same as modern fiat currencies, are not backed by actual 
gold, there were some exceptions in the past which attempted to link virtual currency to actual reserves of gold, e.g. e-gold.  
47 M. Swan, op. cit. no. 38, p. 6. 
48 T. I. Kiviat, op. cit. no. 45, p. 583. 
49 ECB, ‘Virtual Currency Schemes – a Further Analysis’ (2015), p. 11. 
50 Data last accessed 20.8.2018. 
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Most important aspects of cryptocurrencies are that they are not issued by centralized 
state authorities, their circulation is voluntary and most importantly, they are not just 
currencies but a whole transaction and settlement system which is based on decentralization, 
transparency and immutability. In order to understand cryptocurrencies from the legal point, 
we first need to consider why they are currently so popular and how they are used. Firstly, 
blockchain-based currencies and systems are used by general public as payment instruments 
for purchase of goods and services. Cryptocurrency options are increasingly offered namely in 
eCommerce markets (e.g. check-out process of eShops), however, solutions for non-remote 
retail markets are also becoming more widespread, as an example of which might serve 
popular Bitcoin cafés. Secondly, Bitcoins and other cryptocurrencies are largely exchanged 
and traded in marketplaces called exchanges, either for fiat currencies, or for other 
cryptocurrencies. In that regard, they might be subject of speculation due to the volatility of 
the market. And lastly, cryptocurrencies might also interfere with financial and capital 
markets with introduction of ICOs and derivates based on cryptocurrencies. 
Many experts52 have pondered about the reasons and causes of creation of 
cryptocurrencies. Currently, most of them come to the conclusion that one of the major 
reasons was the financial crisis in 2008 started by the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers 
Holdings inc. in the US and the following chain failure of global financial system and arising 
frustration of general public with monetary instruments and decisions of central banks around 
the world and other government authorities as a reaction to the crisis. While cryptocurrencies 
represent an exciting novelty for companies and investors in terms of new ways of 
investment, as will be discussed below, it must be stressed that average consumers called for 
change in monetary and payment affairs as well. The frustration of the general public with 
centralized authorities which required trust and were necessary for every transaction while 
imposing high fees and leaving little to no control to consumers themselves was likely at the 
root of ideas leading to the cryptocurrency concept based on peer-to-peer decentralization, 
traceability, immutability, lack of government control and most importantly, no trust. The 
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only trust incorporated was the trust of users that the currency will prevail and will be tradable 
in future. Another key factor seems to be the increase of so-called strong and thriving virtual 
communities thanks to the strong presence of Internet, namely in connection with online 
games or social media.53 Thus from the first glance, with Bitcoin manifesto a global private 
currency was created which was to escape the grasp of any and all world governments.  
3.1.1. Legal Definition and Regulation of Cryptocurrencies at the European Level 
Cryptocurrencies are likely to be considered digital cash but they might not be 
considered a currency/legal tender from the legal point of view. Namely, “money is an 
economic category, as the currency is a legal category. So that money can be labeled a 
currency, it must be acknowledged as such by an authority (usually by the state), which 
specifies the form of the money and determines the precise conditions under which the 
currency is used.”54 In case of cryptocurrencies, there is no such authority – could 
cryptocurrencies still be considered currency? It seems that at the EU level the conclusion is 
firmly negative, cryptocurrencies cannot be considered currencies. Yves Mersch, Member of 
the Executive Board of the ECB, supported this conclusion in May 2018 by stating that “it is 
very clear that [virtual currencies] currently do not fulfill the three basic functions of money: 
they are inefficient media of exchange, poor stores of value and are not used as units of 
account.”55 
The first EU institution to publish an opinion regarding cryptocurrencies was the ECB 
in 2012 in which it set forth a definition of virtual currencies as “a type of unregulated, digital 
money, which is issued and usually controlled by its developers, and used and accepted 
among the members of a specific virtual community”.56 Although the ECB later modified its 
definition, at that time, it viewed virtual currencies as a marginal system applied only “within 
a narrow group of people”.57 The ECB further specified that it recognized 3 types of virtual 
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55 See ‘Virtual currencies ante portas’ by Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB at the 39th meeting of the Governor’s 
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currencies in total where the third type allowing “bidirectional flow” (i.e. exchange of fiat 
currency for virtual currency and vice versa) is what we generally know cryptocurrencies to 
be today.58 While the ECB admitted that virtual currencies might under certain circumstances 
entail some considerable risks for central banks, namely in respect of (i) price stability59, (ii) 
financial stability, (iii) payment system stability and (iv) reputation60, it ruled out any serious 
implications based on the small significance of virtual financial markets. In the end, the ECB 
stressed that even though virtual currencies are used in exchange for goods and services, they 
could not be regarded as money and/or currency, nor do they fulfill the definition criteria of e-
money (i.e. essentially state currency in electronic/digital form) and thus, could not be 
covered by the e-money Directive.61 That is specifically due to article 11(2) which states: 
“Member States shall ensure that, upon request by the electronic money holder, electronic 
money issuers redeem, at any moment and at par value, the monetary value of the electronic 
money held.” As the ECB points out, this cannot be fulfilled in distributed transaction 
systems, such as Bitcoin. Firstly, Bitcoins are not issued in exchange for currency but created 
by mining. And secondly, their value depends on the state of the market and demand for 
Bitcoins.62 
In its report from 2015 the ECB modified its definition of virtual currencies and 
removed certain inaccuracies: “virtual currency [is] a digital representation of value, not 
issued by a central bank, credit institution or e-money institution, which, in some 
circumstances, can be used as an alternative to money.”63 However, despite this rather liberal 
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definition, the ECB firmly repeated its conclusion that cryptocurrencies are not to be 
considered a currency or payment instrument and thus fall out of the scope of supervision and 
control of the ECB, thereby leaving their regulation to Member States. 
In 2017, an additional report confirmed its stance that cryptocurrencies are currently not 
regulated at the EU level64 and focused more on different approaches of Member States and 
other jurisdictions and additional technologies built on blockchain, e.g., smart contracts.  
 The EBA was the second European institution to focus on cryptocurrencies. Firstly, it 
issued a warning to consumers in 201365 where it emphasized risks related to trade of 
cryptocurrencies and secondly, in 2014 it issued a full report. In the report, the EBA provided 
a definition of virtual currencies which largely influenced the ECB’s improved definition 
from 2015. Further, the EBA also concurred that although virtual currencies represent a 
“medium of exchange”, they are not payment instruments, currencies66 or legal tenders67, at 
least within the EU.68 Apart from determining the risks of trading with cryptocurrencies for 
users, regulators and other participants, the EBA strongly recommended regulation of 
cryptocurrencies and that “national supervisory authorities discourage credit institutions, 
payment institutions, and e-money institutions from buying, holding or selling [virtual 
currencies], thereby ‘shielding’ regulated financial services from [virtual currencies].”69 
What is particularly interesting, as the EBA pointed out, all main advantages that are so 
closely linked to cryptocurrencies, namely in regard to low transaction fees and shorter 
processing time, are less significant for EU citizens due to the well functioning framework of 
SEPA area70 which will be elaborated on below. Therefore, such “benefits are likely to 
materialize outside the EU, in regions where the payment infrastructure may be less 
developed or less trustworthy.”71  
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Finally, the EBA also called for inclusion of crypto-exchanges and providers of 
eWallets into the scope of obliged persons under the anti-money laundering legal framework 
in the EU level (further elaborated on in the section on illicit behavior in relation to 
cryptocurrencies, please see 4.7 of this thesis). Consequently, these entities providing crypto-
related services were indeed included in the scope of the obliged persons by the adoption of 
the fifth AML Directive72 which entered into force on 9 July 2018. The fifth AML Directive 
is now the first European legal regulation which defines virtual currencies, as follows: “a 
digital representation of value that is not issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public 
authority, is not necessarily attached to a legally established currency and does not possess a 
legal status of currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of 
exchange and which can be transferred, stored and traded electronically.” 
The firm conclusion that cryptocurrencies are not currencies or money at the EU level 
might be in contradiction with the opinion and interpretation of the CJEU. In its judgment 
Hedqvist73 its main focus was the determination whether cryptocurrencies should be exempt 
from VAT (for the taxation issue, please see section 3.1.6 of this thesis). The CJEU eliminates 
the possibility that Bitcoin could be regarded as a form of e-money or security. Further, it 
comes to the conclusion that Bitcoin is a non-traditional currency but currency nonetheless 
whose sole purpose is to be a means of payment and accepts that parties may choose it as an 
alternative to legal tender.74 However, it should be noted that it this judgment the CJEU 
considered provision of exchange services only in the bidirectional sense, i.e. cryptocurrency 
for fiat currency and vice versa. It remains to be seen whether the same approach would hold 
in case of purely crypto-transactions (cryptocurrency for cryptocurrency). 
Among other EU authorities which expressed their opinion on cryptocurrencies was 
also the European Parliament which called for close monitoring of future development of this 
area, EP’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the European Parliamentary 
Research Service or European Commission.  
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It should be pointed out that despite EBA’s recommendation to discourage closer 
cooperation and interest of banks and financial institutions with virtual currencies, recent 
development shows that there are authorized and regulated banks in the EU willing to support 
or implement blockchain solutions. In 2013 a partnership between an international 
cryptocurrency exchange Kraken and German internet-based Fidor Bank specialized in 
innovative banking services was announced.75 Another example might be a major Dutch bank 
called Rabobank which is reportedly considering acquiring an eWallet solution and offering 
their customers to access their fiat and cryptocurrencies within one bank account.76 Moreover, 
certain banks based in Lichtenstein and Switzerland have already decided to offer trading and 
investment in cryptocurrencies. The Lichtenstein Bank Frick has opted for cold wallets which 
ensure offline storing of private keys, therefore, mitigating the potential hacker attack risk.77 
There are currently three possible approaches of regulatory development78: (i) complete 
prohibition, (ii) government regulation, or (iii) provided that crucial aspects are regulated, 
such as AML, self-regulation, i.e. laissez-faire. Assuming that the first possibility is a solution 
ultima ratio in developed countries, it will not be further assessed. The camp supporting the 
second option calls for complete and specific regulation targeted at these systems which 
would set down particular requirements in terms of financial stability, security, etc. This 
group is especially supported by security experts and risk analytics.79 While the EBA strongly 
supported this opinion in 2014, it should be emphasized that the above mentioned 
recommendations of the EBA were specifically referred to as immediate regulatory response 
until the issue is settled and a regime is agreed upon.80 The advantage of this approach would 
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be a unified front and harmonization which would exclude deformation of the internal market 
and “shopping for the most convenient approach”81 within the EU. 
The third group advocates for a rather liberal approach in the sense that submitting 
cryptocurrencies to the scope of anti-money laundering and payment frameworks stipulated 
by European legislation but carried out with slight differences at the national level, might be 
sufficient.82 One of the main reasons for the conclusion which seems to be in line with the 
interpretation and recommendation of the ECB would be that distributed transaction systems 
are in many way very similar to traditional payment and financial systems. Therefore, should 
the regulation of these new systems be strikingly different, it might lead to distortion of 
competition.83   
3.1.2. Legal Definition and Regulation at National Levels  
In this section it will be briefly discussed how cryptocurrencies are viewed in certain 
individual jurisdictions within and outside the EU84. Many financial experts have stated that 
Bitcoin and other similar cryptocurrency schemes have the features of currency and 
commodity as well.85 From the survey conducted in June 2018 it follows that there are four 
major approaches relating to qualification of cryptocurrencies that Member States take.  
(i) Some Member States have expressed an opinion according to which they 
consider cryptocurrencies commodities. This group of states includes Austria 
and the Czech Republic.86 
(ii) Other Member States, such as Latvia, Slovakia, Italy or Germany (Germany 
defines cryptocurrencies as “units of account”) qualify them as financial 
instruments.87 
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(iii) A couple of Member States apply a more lenient regime and either explicitly or 
implicitly treat cryptocurrencies as money and/or currency, for instance 
Luxembourg or Malta.88 
(iv) The majority of Member States, however, take a rather passive approach in line 
with interpretations of the ECB and EBA. Some of them only warn consumers 
and state that cryptocurrencies are not regulated (Slovenia, Greece)89. Others 
explicitly stipulate that cryptocurrencies cannot be regarded as money/currency 
and legal tender without providing additional positive definitions (Belgium, 
Poland90). 
In terms of jurisdictions outside the EU and their qualification of cryptocurrencies, the 
following states will be assessed: China, Japan, Canada and USA.  
Chinese regulators have stated that cryptocurrencies were a “special virtual 
commodity”. Due to their statement that cryptocurrencies were not currencies and were not to 
be used and circulated as such and subsequent prohibition of ICOs, China de facto banned 
cryptocurrencies altogether.91  
Japan, a representative of a more liberal jurisdiction, has defined cryptocurrency as a 
“property value” and enacted a regulation package, including an amendment to Payment 
Services Act which imposes registration and other requirements on exchanges.92 
Canada allows the use of cryptocurrencies on its territory, however, expressly states that 
they are not considered currency or legal tender, even though the Canadian law on anti-money 
laundering qualifies virtual currencies as “money service businesses”.93  
In the USA, the regulation of cryptocurrencies is not exclusive to the federal level, thus 
individual states’ authorities may contribute and enact their own definitions and regulations 
(e.g. Arizona, Delaware, New York), although federal regulation is in preparations. Many 
federal bodies have issued their opinions which, however, substantially differ and consensus 
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regarding legal nature and definition of cryptocurrencies has not yet been reached. Some of 
these authorities have considered cryptocurrencies as securities, some as commodities and 
some as money/currency94 (to this regard, even the Supreme Court indicated that 
interpretation of money might need to be extended95). 
In regard to the legal status of cryptocurrencies around the world, it is also necessary to 
note that there are jurisdictions which completely ban their usage and trade on their territory. 
Countries imposing absolute ban include United Arab Emirates, Egypt or Bolivia. In other 
states, the factual ban follows only implicitly from their respective regulatory framework – 
Colombia, Saudi Arabia but also for example China.96 
3.1.3. State-Backed Cryptocurrency 
While some countries have rigorously expressed their disapproval with potential state 
backed cryptocurrency development (e.g., Denmark), others are seriously considering it and 
there might be quite a few reasons for it. Firstly, it would enable central banks and other 
supervisory authorities to test different regulatory approaches and familiarize themselves with 
the inner workings of cryptocurrencies and their markets. 
Secondly, in a hypothetical case where cryptocurrencies de facto become direct 
competition to legal tenders in terms of circulation, a cryptocurrency recognized as a legal 
tender would ensure stability. Simultaneously, central banks would feel more comfortable 
with accepting a crypto legal tender that they have designed or at least have some control over 
its development. State cryptocurrency might lead to deeper understanding, invention of 
solutions for blockchain issues which are currently unacceptable for most jurisdictions and all 
in all might also attract developers and investors.  
Malta is among countries considering “introducing its own cryptocurrency within a 
‘controlled framework’” with the goal to test its newest crypto-regulatory package.97 
                                                 
 
94 Please see S. Stankovic, ‘US Cryptocurrency Regulation: Policies, Regimes & More’ (2018), available at: https://unblock.net/us-
cryptocurrency-regulation/#h3, last accessed 19.8.2018.  
95 Please see P. Farquhar, ‘The US Supreme Court just spoke about a Bitcoin future for the first time’ (2018), available at: 
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-us-supreme-court-just-spoke-about-a-bitcoin-future-for-the-first-time-2018-6, last accessed 
19.8.2018.  
96 ‘Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World’ (2018), op. cit. no. 84. 





Similarly, Bahamas, namely, Grand Bahama Island, wishes to establish itself as a “digital 
hub” with its own cryptocurrency. More importantly, due to the fact that Bahamian dollar is 
pegged to the USD, potential Bahaman cryptocurrency might give them more monetary and 
economic freedom.98  
Within Europe, Sweden and Switzerland are among countries considering to develop 
their cryptocurrencies serving as legal tenders, e-krona99 and e-franc100 respectively. Similar 
projects are in progress in Estonia (Estcoin)101 or UK (RSCoin)102. However, should an EU 
Member State in fact proceed with establishment of cryptocurrency as a legal tender, it might 
face some challenges in terms of EU institutions and eurozone.103  
Cryptocurrencies may also help developing countries or countries hit by a catastrophe 
resulting in instability, depreciation of hyperinflation of their currency. Nonetheless, it can 
also be used to deflect negative economic effects legally inflicted as sanctions, for example 
embargos. In the end of 2017 Venezuela became infamous as one of the first countries in the 
world to declare that it will establish its own cryptocurrency – petro – and to go even further 
Venezuelan government stated that it would be backed by their national oil reserves. 
Venezuelan economy is currently suffering extreme hyperinflation mainly due to sanctions 
imposed by the US government.104 Despite following controversies caused by Venezuelan 
Parliament’s declaration that the cryptocurrency is illegal and cannot be backed by oil 
reserves, petro is supposed to become a legal tender by the end of 2018 and Venezuelan 
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government is trying to provide incentives in order to ensure wide adoption among 
Venezuelan people.105 
Another famous case of attempt at national cryptocurrency relates to Auroracoin, an 
altcoin established by private persons in Iceland with the goal to overcome strict monetary 
policy resulting from the 2008 financial crisis, namely in respect of stricter currency 
convertibility.106 The founders gave away Auroracoins to every person registered in the 
Iceland’s national ID database, however, probably due to the controversial status in terms of 
legality and negative statements from Icelandic political representatives, the Auroracoin 
project failed as the value plummeted.   
Similarly, Scot-coin was created with intention to become a new Scottish legal tender 
which might become of crucial importance, should Scotland decide to leave the UK after 
Brexit.107 
3.1.4. Initial Coin Offering 
In recent years many centralized platforms for crowdfunding were introduced and 
quickly became popular, with the purpose of finding investors to back usually a controversial 
or risky idea. The underlying principle of platforms, such as Kickstarter or GoFundMe, is to 
accumulate smaller donations from individuals interested in the project while diluting the 
degree of risk depending on the number of participating individuals. In exchange for a 
donation, the “investor” is then given certain advantage relating to the project, the extent of 
which is directly dependant on the amount of the donation. The main difference between 
crowdfunding and stock investment is that crowd-funders are usually in a position of 
donators. Not often do they get equivalent value in return for their donation. However, there is 
a possibility to acquire something similar to shares of the startup company via crowdfunding, 
or more precisely crowdinvesting campaign, which makes the funding much more similar to 
actual stock investment but without the mandatory regulation. Furthermore, other differences 
include higher risk, as the percentage of success of crowdfunded companies is much lower 
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than that of companies with regulated share exchange. Lastly, there is usually no option of 
dividends for investors participating in crowdfunding.  
For this model to work, a certain degree of trust towards the fundraising organization, 
i.e. the platform, is necessary, similarly to regulated stock exchange investment. With 
application of blockchain, this need for trust can be eliminated and peer-to-peer investment 
can be further improved. “Blockchain-based crowdfunding platforms make it possible for 
startups to raise funds by creating their own digital currencies and selling ‘cryptographic 
shares’ to early backers.” 108  The shares are thus represented by the amount of crypto-tokens.  
The above mentioned blockchain-based crowdfunding campaigns are commonly 
referred to as ICO, initial coin offering in analogy of initial public offering (i.e. a first offer of 
company’s shares to public, usually via a regulated stock exchange). The process is similar, 
the company’s representatives present a project which they require funding for and interested 
investors buy the company’s cryptocurrency in hopes that the value of the obtained shares 
increases in time and they can make profit by selling it. Due to the fact that investors of 
decentralized campaigns obtain certain value in exchange immediately, the fundraisers are 
referred to as crowdsales. The increasing significance that ICOs have attained can be shown 
by recent statistics, according to which ICO campaigns have raised 45 % of the amount raised 
by traditional IPOs in the second quarter of 2018.109 
Nonetheless, it is evident that such mechanism may violate many national and European 
regulations which are put in place in order to protect consumers from illicit investment 
projects. Potential triggering of stock investment regulations depends on determination 
whether the cryptocurrency falls in the scope of financial instrument. As follows from the 
above mentioned, EU institutions largely leave that determination to Member States and do 
not provide a clear answer.110 Subsequently, qualification differs across individual 
jurisdictions. Some Member States, such as Latvia, Slovakia, Italy or Germany have declared 
that they view cryptocurrencies as financial instruments.111 In such a case, ICOs taking place 
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within their jurisdiction will trigger some statutory requirements. In line with the ESMA’s 
statement from 2017, entities participating in the ICO could potentially be involved in 
placing, dealing in or advising on financial instruments which are all regulated investment 
activities under the MiFID II package applicable from January 2018112 and thus, are subject to 
authorization obligation. According to ESMA, “the organization requirements, the conduct of 
business rules and the transparency requirements laid down in MiFID would then apply, 
depending in some cases on the services provided.” 113 
In the event that the cryptocurrency subject to an ICO meets the definition criteria of 
transferable securities114 (particularly if shares in the issuing company are offered in 
exchange), additional statutory obligations may apply, namely the provision of required scope 
of information by way of prospectus in line with the Prospectus Directive115. This minimal 
scope of information shall include the identity of the “issuer, the offeror, the party seeking 
admission to trading or the guarantor”.116 
Finally, due to the fact that ICO organizers collect funds from the general public and 
apply their own rules, this activity might be categorized as “[raising] capital from a number 
of investors, with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy”117 and 
as such, might qualify them as managers of alternative investment funds under the AIFM 
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Directive.118 In such a case, they would need to comply with information, capital, operational 
and organizational obligations. Please note that application of AMLD is assessed separately in 
section 4.7 of this thesis. 
Some other Member States have stated in relation to ICOs that they will assess legal 
nature and applicable obligations relating to ICOs on a case-by-case basis. Among these states 
are for instance the Netherlands, Lithuania, Ireland or Germany. Depending on the 
qualification of individual Member States, issuers of cryptocurrencies in terms of ICO might 
also be subject to authorization obligations. As was described above, Malta is introducing a 
regulatory package for cryptocurrencies. Interestingly, part of the proposed framework is a 
“financial instrument test” which shall help determining whether a cryptocurrency and an ICO 
fulfill the definition of a financial instrument and consequently, what regulatory requirements 
should apply.119 
Nevertheless, the situation is a bit different for derivates based on cryptocurrencies. 
Based on ESMA’s interpretation120 these shall generally be considered as financial 
instruments, without the necessity for further assessment. The derivates may include namely 
cryptocurrency futures, cryptocurrency contracts for differences (CFDs) and cryptocurrency 
options.121  
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that apart from the warning to ICO 
issuers, ESMA has also issued a number of warnings to consumers in which it has 
emphasized particularly inadequate scope of provided information, instability of market and 
scarce exit options.122 
Outside of the EU, some jurisdictions like China in 2017, have decided to ban ICOs 
completely, particularly due to doubts concerning protection of investors who are generally 
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not professionals. Some decentralized crowdsale platforms have tried to bypass the regulation 
and bans by way of approximating their activity more to crowdfunding platforms in the sense 
that they have tried to sell “non-share items, such as early access to software. However, this is 
somewhat disingenuous because in many cases the market still looks a lot like selling shares. 
The result is that there can be de facto investors in cryptocurrency projects who are not 
getting much more than early access to open source software.”123 
3.1.5.  Payment Services and Regulation 
Blockchain technology is among inventions and technologies which are highly 
interesting and developed in the FinTech sector. FinTech sector relates to companies which 
develop new solutions with the aim to innovate and improve financial and payment services, 
namely in the retail sector, and potentially, to dilute the high concentration of power which is 
currently given to financial institutions as authorized providers. This sector has been 
historically highly concentrated especially due to market barriers, whether due to 
regulatory/authorization requirements, or “infrastructure, asymmetric information, the cost of 
holding capital, the ability to manage large capital flows, and low transparency.”124 
While decentralized transaction systems share many features with traditional retail 
payment systems, particularly e-money, they differ in some aspects. As was stated above, they 
lack supervision (no centralized authority), mostly also regulation and offer instant global 
coverage.125 In respect of payment services, two major advantages that decentralized systems 
bring and that potentially may create competition for traditional payment systems are low 
transaction fees and shorter processing time. 
As was elaborated by the EBA, “although reliable and independent data on the exact 
costs of [virtual currencies] transactions is difficult to ascertain, some anecdotal suggestions 
have been made that average transaction fees on the Bitcoin network tend to be less than 
0,0005 BTC, or 1 % of the transaction amount.” And continues: “this compares with 2 % - 4 
% for traditional online payment systems or an estimated 8 % - 9 % for remittance without 
involving bank accounts via money transmitters.”126 The EBA is of the opinion that one of the 
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main factors responsible for this difference is that distributed transaction systems do not have 
to include costs incurred in security and compliance matters and further states that advantages 
relating to low transaction fees are much less significant for European citizens due to well-
functioning SEPA project.127 While it is true that thanks to SEPA, transaction fees for wire 
transfers in euro have considerably decreased, it should be emphasized that cryptocurrencies 
have the potential to go much further. Firstly, they are not limited to one currency, unlike 
SEPA and secondly, apart from transaction and eWallet fees, there are no other fees related to 
payment services. Therefore, many charges and levies currently imposed by financial 
institutions, such as account-holding fee, credit card related fees, wire transfer related fees and 
limitations, etc are non-existent in the crypto-world. Furthermore, as ECB128 and EBA129 
concur, the economic potential grows if we take into account international payments130 where 
banks attempt to transfer payments via the shortest route within the SWIFT system but 
impose high fees and require long processing time. Several days which are usually required 
for clearing and settlement of large transactions can be shortened to minutes or hours 
(depending whether we include verification time) on business days and weekends. 
On the other hand, materialization of above mentioned advantages might be hindered 
due to consumer protection. Many of consumer risks follow from the fact that blockchain-
based technologies are not yet mainstream and require a certain degree of IT knowledge.131 
Furthermore, even if a consumer is a victim of illicit behavior, due to the setting of system, it 
might be difficult to ascertain evidence.132 To provide a concrete example, the immutability as 
a key aspect might also pose a problem under consumer legislation, in particular, once a 
transaction has been confirmed and added to the chain, it cannot be cancelled which is in 
contradiction with current consumer protection legislation that allows consumers to cancel a 
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payment transaction. Should a reason for cancellation occur, a refund would depend on the 
merchant’s good will.133 
Consumer protection is why some think that decentralized transaction systems should 
be regulated to ensure that they fulfill the same requirements as other payment systems. 
Another reason is that until decentralized transaction systems are somewhat regulated, due to 
the lack of any centralized authority, state authorities, such as law enforcement bodies but 
also certified enforcement agents/bailiffs do not have any legal actions at their disposal to 
interfere with individual’s crypto-resources without his or her permission. For instance, 
potential enforcement of court order to freeze assets including cryptocurrency may be very 
complicated or even impossible.134 The principal reason against this opinion is that 
decentralized transaction systems are simply not yet big enough in terms of transacted 
mass.135  
Potential application of currently available legal framework relating to payment services 
faces a number of obstacles. PSD2 Directive136 which regulates provision of retail payment 
services within the EU market defines obliged entities as payment service providers the 
categories of which are enumerated in Article 1(1): (i) credit institutions, (ii) electronic money 
institutions, (iii) post office giro institutions, (iv) payment institutions, (v) the ECB and 
national central banks and (vi) Member States and their authorities. As follows from the 
ECB’s opinion137 decentralized blockchain-based systems are not likely to fall in the scope of 
the e-money directive as cryptocurrencies cannot be considered e-money. That leaves only 
one potential group of obliged entities – payment institutions. These are defined in Article 
4(4) as “a legal person that has been granted authorization in accordance with Article 11 to 
provide and execute payment services throughout the Union.” Among these services which 
are defined in Annex I of the PSD2, is also execution of transactions. A payment transaction 
is then defined in Article 4(5) as “an act initiated by the payer or on his behalf or by the 
payee, of placing transferring or withdrawing funds, irrespective of any underlying 
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obligations between the payer and the payee.” While it seems that decentralized transaction 
systems do meet all these criteria, the crucial word of the definition is funds which has a 
limited meaning under the PSD2 and encompasses only “banknotes and coins, scriptural 
money or electronic money”. We thus arrive to the same issue and that is that if Bitcoin and 
others cannot be considered e-money, then all related regulation cannot be applied. Opposite 
interpretation would require extensive analogy. 
More importantly, even if we disregard the above mentioned, the biggest issue is that 
the concept of PSD2 is based on centralized understanding of provision of payment services 
and does not fit with the cryptocurrency world. Namely, the PSD2 requires legal entities and 
providers of services which can hardly be pinpointed in a decentralized transaction system 
where a transaction is authorized and consequently verified multiple times by unrelated nodes 
in the network.138 In line with the mentioned CJEU’s decision in Hedqvist and most recent 
AMLD5, it could be argued that by analogy, PSD2 could be applicable at least to 
cryptocurrency exchanges. 
Therefore, the prevailing conclusion is that the PSD2 is currently not applicable to 
decentralized transaction systems, such as Bitcoin.139 Nevertheless, this conclusion might not 
pertain to all blockchain-based transaction systems.140 As was described above, not all 
blockchain-based technologies are as decentralized as Satoshi Nakamoto described in his 
Bitcoin manifesto. Therefore, systems like Ripple which are centralized to some extent may 
qualify as payment providers and payment systems under the PSD2. Unlike Bitcoin, Ripple 
does have “one single institution which is able to issue units at its choice” which is the Ripple 
Foundation which also provides the cloud where the client cryptocurrency is stored141. The 
transaction is then processed via gateways (typically exchanges).142 If we consider that such 
gateways and/or the Ripple Foundation itself can be, under certain circumstances, considered 
payment services providers, then the second obstacle standing in the way of PSD2 
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application, as shown above, can be circumvented. However, Ripple cryptocurrency is still 
not regarded as e-money, therefore, the interpretation issue remains.  
Due to its more centralized nature which gives more control to financial institutions, 
Ripple system can be used as a complement to services provided by already authorized 
providers of payment services. That is the case of the German Fidor Bank, as described 
above, which decided to implement the Ripple system for some of its payment services.143  
In addition, blockchain technology can also serve financial institutions and other 
obliged persons under the PSD2 to ensure compliance, e.g. authentication and sharing of 
information. This is especially interesting for so-called RegTech projects which are subject of 
section 4.9 of this thesis. 
3.1.6. Taxation 
 Taxation is generally viewed as an issue when it comes to cryptocurrencies. The 
reason is their complicated legal status and qualification, as per previous paragraphs. 
However, irrespective of their legal definition and potential volatility, cryptocurrencies do 
hold value and trade with them can generate substantial revenue, similarly to securities and 
other financial instruments intended for investment.  
At the European level, the VAT represents the only harmonized tax and as such is 
subject to the VAT Directive144. As already mentioned in 3.1.1 of this thesis, in 2015 the 
CJEU adjudicated a preliminary question submitted by a Swedish court in case Hedqvist. 
David Hesqvist, a Swedish citizen, wanted to establish a company which would provide 
bidirectional exchange services (cryptocurrency for fiat currency and vice versa) for a 
consideration (fee) included in the respective exchange rate. Before starting his business, Mr 
Hedqvist referred to the Swedish Revenue Law Commission with a request for preliminary 
assessment whether such activities would be subject to VAT. The Revenue Law Commission 
expressed the opinion that exemption under Article 135(1)(e) of the VAT Directive relating to 
exchange services of legal tenders should be interpreted as encompassing Mr Hedqvist’s 
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activity, as the cryptocurrency has the same purpose as legal tenders – to serve as means of 
payment.145  
Nonetheless, Skatteverket – the Swedish Tax Authority disagreed and subsequently 
initiated administrative proceedings which gave rise to the preliminary question at hand.   
The Court held that such services are to be considered as provision of services for 
consideration and thus subject of the VAT Directive. Moreover, the Court stated that 
“transactions exempt from VAT under those provisions are, by their nature, financial 
transactions even though they do not necessarily have to be carried out by banks or financial 
institutions.”146 Further, it interpreted the exemption under Article 135(1)(e) of the VAT 
Directive concerning “transactions, including negotiation, concerning currency, bank notes 
and coins used as legal tender, with the exception of collectors’ items, that is to say, gold, 
silver or other metal coins or bank notes which are not normally used as legal tender or coins 
of numismatic interest” as encompassing other, non-traditional currencies, including 
cryptocurrencies, that the parties to the transaction chose as an alternative to legal tender.147 
Based on the CJEU’s opinion that Bitoin’s (the cryptocurrency in question) sole purpose was 
to serve as a means of payment148, it held that the exchange services in the case at hand shall 
be exempt from VAT. This conclusion is in line with principle of fiscal neutrality and the 
Opinion of the AG Kokott149 who emphasized that the objective of the exemption at hand was 
to prevent hindering of the convertibility of legal tenders and as Bitcoins do not have other 
purpose than to serve as means of payment, the distinction whether they are “good” or “bad” 
currency does not justify their different treatment VAT-wise.150 
As follows, due to the VAT Directive and the CJEU’s approach in Hedqvist, the 
regulatory stance across Europe151 is rather unified in this matter. Most EU Member States 
concur and exempt exchange services from VAT. However, the situation is different for other 
practices relating to cryptocurrencies, for instance the mining activities. Finland considers the 
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mining activity as production of goods and therefore, subjects it to the VAT152. Similarly, 
Russia (even though not a Member State) imposes VAT obligation after a certain energy 
consumption threshold is reached153, while Austria154 and Sweden155 exempt mining from the 
VAT due to the fact that there are no identifiable recipients. 
 Apart from VAT, other taxes, in particular income related, may apply, depending on 
legal definition and regulatory approach of individual Member States. The situation will 
differ, as income taxes are not harmonized. Essentially, individuals’ revenues tend to be 
subject to capital gains taxes, especially if cryptocurrencies are regarded as similar to 
commodities, for instance Finland, Ireland or UK156. Business revenues, namely in relation to 
financial services and exchanges are usually taxed as corporate income tax, e.g., Bulgaria, 
Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, the UK157. Another relating issue then arises in respect of tax 
deductions. Some jurisdictions allow submission of losses incurred in crypto-markets 
(whether due to usual volatility or due to an attack), as tax deductions for the purposes of 
income taxes. These jurisdictions include Denmark and Italy158. Other Member States do not 
see them as tax deductible, e.g. Finland159. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted 
that Spanish government even considers introduction of “tax breaks” to attract blockchain 
developers.160 
3.2. Smart Contracts and Ethereum  
3.2.1. Ethereum 
The Ethereum project was proposed in 2013 by a Bitcoin enthusiast Vitalik Butarin who 
based some fundamentals on the Bitcoin’s protocol but went a step further to enable self-
                                                 
 
152 Ibid, pp 36-38. 
153 Ibid, pp 75-76. 
154 Ibid, pp 30-31. 
155 Ibid, pp 55-58. 
156 Ibid, pp 36-38, 42-44, 58-59. 
157 Ibid, pp 44-45, 52-53, 55, 58-59. 
158 Ibid, pp 34-36, 44-45. 
159 Ibid, pp 34-36. 





executing smart contracts and a Turing-complete protocol which would allow building of 
additional programming layers. 
Turing-completeness refers to an “ability to run any coin, protocol, or blockchain”161 
and is ensured by Ehtereum’s programming language called Solidity which has been often 
compared to JavaScript, the basis of many applications, such as Gmail or Facebook.162 The 
language is stack-based, not binary like Bitcoin which is what enables creation and execution 
of smart contracts, as it enables unlimited number of contract stages. “With Bitcoin, the 
transactions are binary – the Bitcoin are either spent or not spent. With Ethereum, the 
contract does not have to be fulfilled or not fulfilled, but can be in stage one pre-negotiation, 
stage two offer, etc.”163 Another thing which makes Solidity well-suited for smart contracts is 
that it is contract-oriented (as opposed to object-oriented) which enables it to understand 
“concepts such as identity, ownership, and protection forms.”164 
Apart from smart contracts, Ethereum has developed additional supporting protocols “to 
achieve a complete decentralized ecosystem”.165 The first is called Whisper and is intended 
for secret, encrypted messaging within the Ethereum network. “Whisper is also designed to 
provide communication layer that cannot be traced and provides ‘dark communication’ 
between parties”166 which could entail more complications for law enforcement authorities 
(see section 4.7 of this thesis). The second supporting protocol is called Swarm and was 
developed to enable decentralized data storage.167 
Ethereum is currently the second most widespread cryptocurrency and values USD 
290168 per unit while the whole market cap is estimated at approximately USD 29 billion169. 
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3.2.2. Smart Contracts 
Smart contracts are not a new notion brought forward with the creation of blockchains. 
It is a concept authored in 1994 by computer scientist Nick Szabo who defined a smart 
contract as “a computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms of a contract. The 
general objectives are to satisfy common contractual conditions (such as payment terms, 
liens, confidentiality, and even enforcement), minimize exceptions both malicious and 
accidental, and minimize the need for trusted intermediaries. Related economic goals include 
lowering fraud loss, arbitrations and enforcement costs, and other transaction costs.”170 
Essentially a smart contract is like any other contract between two or more parties 
which expresses their agreement relating to a specific subject-matter, except that it is 
digitalized and transformed in code and then embedded in blockchain. What makes it smart is 
the possibility to be self-executing without any human input, only depending on occurrence of 
a specified condition. That condition could be anything; it could be based on the passage of 
time or occurrence of an event. The first option should be relatively easy to verify, as the 
contract can mathematically follow the passage of time and when a specific date and time 
occurs, it can automatically act in accordance with instructions enshrined in its code.171  
In order to ensure the second option where the smart contract should act on an event 
occurring outside of the blockchain world which it does not have access to, a specific type of 
program, called Oracle, was developed. Oracles are used to provide to smart contracts 
essentially any kind of external data ranging from stock prices and exchange rates to weather 
forecast and flight schedules. They can also provide IoT data and data embedded in other 
blockchains. To ensure authenticity of the data, decentralized verification services such as 
TLSNotary can be deployed.172 
Additionally, to ensure physical execution of smart contract in terms of data recorded 
within the blockchain, Ethereum implements Ethereum virtual machine (EVM) programs 
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which are also run by every node in the network. To prevent tempering, EVMs are completely 
isolated and only accept instructions from the smart contract.173 
From the business point of view, smart contracts could bring easier, faster and more 
precise negotiation and conclusion of business transactions.174 For instance, even though the 
majority of an acquisition today is done online, some documents still need to be signed 
personally and manually by authorized persons. Smart contracts would eradicate the travelling 
necessary to ensure signatures on relevant documentation which is nowadays usually 
required, especially in more complex transactions. From the legal point of view, smart 
contract are especially revolutionary because they prevent a breach of contract resulting from 
non-action of the counterparty after particular contractual conditions are met. To provide an 
example, if we picture a contract on sale of goods for which the counterparty is obliged to 
provide payment in regular monthly installments, the final decision whether the installments 
are going to be indeed regular or whether they would be sent at all is always inherently up to 
the buyer. Indeed, the seller does have legal options to defend and enforce his or her claim 
and even enforce payment of penalties; however, all of these solutions come ex post, after the 
breach of contract already occurred. The definitive outcome depends on many factors – the 
buyer’s will to cooperate, potential arbitration or court decision, evidence, etc. Apart from 
that, the seller would need to spend substantial effort, time and financial resources to defend 
his or her rights. “In short, traditional contract enforcement is messy and resource-intensive – 
and it is this perceived inefficiency that motivates much of the excitement about smart 
contracts.”175 
As follows, smart contracts may turn the tables, so that a seller who has already shipped 
the goods can ensure the payment if conditions are met. Certainly, smart contracts do not 
exclude judicial control, i.e. in the event that the buyer does not agree with the execution of 
the smart contract, he or she should be able to recover the provided means before the court. 
Another example where default payment by smart contracts might be convenient are 
unconditional bank guarantees where the bank should not have the power to decide whether 
the claim for the bank guarantee is justified or not. Apart from just automatic payment, smart 
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contracts can perform many more actions e.g., suspend provision of services or delete a 
file.176 
Nonetheless, there are some obstacles which have to be overcome before smart 
contracts can become a norm; they are of technical and legal nature. 
With respect to technical issues, it should be noted that while smart contracts can 
generally be used to transfer any kind of asset or right, they have certain limits. They are 
essentially only enforceable towards property which can be digitalized, such as license rights 
to digital music.177 Goods and especially services which require physical presence and action 
in the real world will always require active will of the counterparty, regardless of the code of 
the smart contract. This is why personal services will not be suitable for smart contracts at all. 
However, adjustments can be made so that objects which are part of the real world can 
become digitalized and thus, subject to smart contract transactions. The solution was brought 
forth by Colored Coins, an alt-coin originally based on Bitcoin but in the Ethereum platform 
running on Ether, which turns assets into “smart property” marking the crypto-tokens in the 
blockchain with specific color to represent a particular asset178, e.g. a car or a house, but also 
“commodities, certificates, shares, bonds, and voting [rights]“.179 The relevant asset can be 
equiped with a system180 which can be connected to the blockchain, therefore, smart contract 
can complete self-execution with consequences in the real world. An often provided example 
is that of a car which due to the installed program cannot be ignited if payment is not provided 
and contract executed.181 Potential digitalization of all tangible and intanglible assets can have 
distrorting effects on how we understand property law. „For instance, access to property can 
be programmatically limited to specific users or device, or even be limited to a person who is 
identified in a record on a blockchain. When brought to the extreme, every piece of property 
could be tied to a potential kill switch, whereby property could be disabled or divested 
remotely though the simple click of a button or a computer algorithm. In such a world, 
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property ownership could vanish, replaced by a web of temporary leasehold interests 
governed by contracts.“182 
In terms of legal issues, there have been some reflections relating to theoretical concepts 
of contract law and whether smart contracts would indeed be able to keep up with them, for 
example, good faith, rescission, legal capacity, manifestation of consent, error, 
unenforceability on public security and other public policy grounds.183 These topics will 
require substantive legal research in order to determine whether smart contracts would indeed 
be legally viable. In order to demonstrate potential difficulties of applying legal regime on 
self-executing technology, a number of particularly interesting practical problems will be 
assessed. 
One of the proclaimed principles of smart contracts is the code is law, meaning that 
whatever is set down in the code should be final and enforceable. However, this principle may 
have some unanticipated consequences. In particular, in the event that the execution of smart 
contract is subsequently contested before a court, one of the problems is that the court will 
likely not be able to read code in which case judicial review of contractual terms would not be 
possible which is not acceptable in a state bound by rule of law principle. “This problem could 
be handled prospectively by developing and maintaining an isolated version of the code 
translated into natural language when the smart contract goes into effect, which could be 
updated as changes to it are made. This should not be burdensome to developers of this 
technology in that they will need to provide a natural language version of the contract to the 
parties to obtain mutual consent.“184  
Relating issue concerns the immutability of transactions which is the underlying 
principle of all blockchains. As was already established, when a transaction is embedded in 
the blockchain ledger, it is essentially “set in stone” which does not work well for contracts 
that may be re-negotiated and amended. Similarly, even if a court held that some provisions 
are not legally valid and wanted to modify them in compliance with applicable legal 
regulations (especially if, for instance, consumer protection is triggered), it would not be 
possible under current settings. “It seems unlikely that large financial institutions, regulators, 
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and government officials will embrace a technology that cannot be changed later, if 
necessary“ 185 However, opposite might be true as quite a few international banks have 
already in 2016 conducted tests on application of smart contract within financial sector, 
including JP Morgan, BNP Paribas or Barclays.186 
A number of doubts are raised with respect to procedural side. Blockchain technology 
entails complications when determining jurisdiction. While the parties are free to provide for 
competent courts or arbitration tribunal and governing law, it is not clear how the situation 
would be handled if parties do not do so, especially if contracting parties are also 
decentralized entities and cannot be pinpointed to one particular jurisdiction. Moreover, 
parties might face difficulties evidence-wise, e.g. how the court would accept blockchain 
settings and apply legal requirements on authenticity and integrity of data. 
Lastly, one of the most discussed issues is the correlation between legal language and 
code. Simply put, code requires clear, precise and deterministic language which would 
enumerate any and all potential situations which might arise. While the (legal) language is 
constantly evolving, it is naturally abstract and sometimes ambiguous because it is usually not 
possible to encompass all potential aspects in connection with the contract. On the one hand, 
many have welcomed it as the lack of flexibility in interpretation would also exclude or 
minimize the parties’ ability to escape their contractual obligations.187 Simultaneously, smart 
contracts’ templates would also minimize the scope of situations when a lawyer is needed to 
draft a contract. This could be also beneficial to lawyers who “will no longer focus on the 
drafting of boilerplate legal provisions; they could leave the details to a machine, and 
concentrate on higher order legal work to identify the core provisions of a contractual 
agreement that should be implemented into code.” 188 Nevertheless, the parties must articulate 
the terms very precisely because an unintended inaccuracy may trigger the contract execution 
at the expense of one party. To be sure, this poses enormous requirements on lawyers. It may 
significantly affect lawyers’ liability and also, would require lawyers to closely cooperate 
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with IT specialists and understand programming concepts behind smart contracts.189 That is 
why this potentially new generation of IT educated lawyers is referred to as “smart lawyers”. 
3.2.3. Dapps, DAOs 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned, smart contracts do not have to exist in an 
isolated environment and for a short period of time. Instead, they can become more complex, 
eventually even self-programmed, and interact with other smart contracts and even AI. 
First step of construction on the fundamentals of blockchain and smart contracts are the 
decentralized applications (Dapps). Although there are many definitions, Dapp is essentially a 
smart contract that coordinates and executes other smart contracts in a pre-defined fashion190. 
Similarly to applications built on JavaScript, there are virtually no limits as to what kinds of 
Dapps can be construed. Most popular Dapps are targeted on market prediction and trading, 
but also games or social networking.191 One of the first Dapps created on the Ethereum 
platform was Augur which was referred to as the most complex Ethereum Dapp and is an 
application for betting on market development.192 Another example of Dapps might be Storj 
for decentralized storage services. It works on similar principles like cloud but instead of 
acquiring data centers, the storage space is leased by users in the network who are rewarded 
for it. In addition, OpenBazaar is a decentralized market place, similar to eBay.193 
A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is created by establishing some kind 
of internal organization which “[outlines] its governance publicly on the blockchain, and a 
mechanism for financing its operations such as issuing equity in a crowdfunding.” In DAO 
smart contracts are elevated to agents who act in accordance with instructions, e.g. for a 
specific task, and can raise and spend financial resources.194 If we compare DAOs with 
traditional organizations, DAO „is an organization where the rules of management are 
predetermined and run on computers.“195 What’s more, unlike usual software, DAO’s smart 
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contracts can be programmed to evolve and adapt over time, e.g. „through the use of 
evolutionary algorithms that would change the organization’s behavior as it collected 
information during the course of its operation.“ This particular aspect brings blockchain 
technology closer to machine learning and AI.  
In 2016 Ethereum created and crowdfunded a DAO (called “the DAO”) targeted at 
investment without management but controlled by „shareholders voting based on their stakes 
on a blockchain“.196 However, that same year an insider, reportedly, found and exploited a 
weakness in the programming which led to a hack attack draining more than USD 50 million 
from the DAO’s funding197. While the money was subsequently recovered in a counter-
attack198, the incident left crypto-community disturbed and wondering whether smart 
contracts are actually viable. To stop the attack, the developers introduced a hard fork which 
caused controversy, as a part of Ethereum users believed that it goes against decentralization 
principles and immutability. Subsequently, Ethereum split. Those who accepted the hard fork 
upgrade stayed on the Ethereum platform with the currency Ether (ETH), while the 
“orthodox“ users renamed the original Ethereum platform as the Ethereum Classic with the 
currency Ether (ETC).199 
Due to their strictly decentralized and pseudonymous nature, the deployment of DAOs 
in practice might entail some legal difficulties, e.g. in respect of jurisdiction and their 
predisposition for criminal activities. 
3.2.4. Management of Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property rights refers to protection of human ideas and all values that are 
hence created, regardless whether the result has tangible or intangible form. At the European 
level, protection of intellectual property rights is ensured by a number of primary and 
secondary legal instruments, including the package of directives and regulations targeted at 
different kinds and aspects of intellectual property to ensure approximation of Member States’ 
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laws.200 The purpose of the legislation is to ensure protection of authorship, fair and adequate 
licensing requirements and distribution of royalties.  
At this time there are quite a few issues which make determination and enforcement of 
IP rights complicated and ineffective. For instance, current procedures for registration of 
patents, trademarks, industrial designs or copyrights, if applicable201, are lengthy, complicated 
and non-transparent and in many cases lead to disputes regarding determination of who is the 
author/owner, when was the protected mark or design used for the first time, etc. Further, the 
management of copyright is nowadays usually left to intermediaries for collective 
management who, thanks to their unique and convenient position, are allowed to retain large 
portions of royalties which results in unfair treatment of authors of copyright works and 
allocation of revenues.202 
Blockchain can improve some aspects of the situation. Firstly, any kind of work can be 
registered in blockchain immediately after it is created, or even as a draft203. Additionally, the 
recorded data can be encrypted to prevent parasite behavior.204 Due to its transparency, 
traceability and immutability a large blockchain database can help track the history of any 
kind of idea which may simplify the registration process and prevent disputes. Even though 
databases can be created on a centralized basis as well, “the difference with blockchain is that 
the sequence of events and associated timeline is much more reliable and consequently much 
better evidence for court or registry proceedings.“205  
It is important to keep in mind that blockchain cannot replace registration offices such 
as patent offices due to the fact that even though blockchain can prove authenticity and 
integrity of information (as a proof of existence), it cannot guarantee that recorded content 
should be granted IP protection, e.g. that an invention should be granted a patent due to its 
benefits and novelty. These services can, so far, be only provided by patent offices comprised 
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of human beings. On the other hand blockchain database with proofs of existence can 
minimize risks of speculation, as it becomes exponentially more difficult for a “patent troll” to 
prove that he or she should be granted patent or trademark protection instead of the rightful 
author/owner.   
Secondly, the territorial principle which IP rights are based on requires separate 
registration in individual Member States, in some cases simplified and harmonized at the 
European level. However, in the event that all works, marks and designs are registered in a 
global database not depending of territorial borders, which blockchain can provide, one 
registration can ensure protection across the EU, in line with the one-stop-shop principle.  
Thirdly, together with deployment of smart contracts, blockchain can enable automatic 
and fair licensing which might, to some extent, eliminate need for intermediaries. Moreover, 
licensed rights can be effectively bundled so that each user gets and pays for what he or she 
exactly needs. Smart contracts can also ensure that licensed rights can be subject to 
inheritance so that collections of digital content can be passed down similarly to tangible 
books, DVDs or gramophone desks. 
In this regard, the recent spike in popularity of streaming services, such as Spotify, 
Pandora or Netflix might suggest that the consumer culture of copyright works will switch 
from licensed ownership to online streaming which would mean that blockchain databases 
would seemingly not be necessary in this field. The switch of approach was enabled by lower 
prices of mobile internet access and widespread coverage of WiFi networks and by the new 
business model which these services are based on and which provides unlimited content for 
relatively low price. In light of the case PRCA v NLA and Others206, streaming was deemed 
compliant with the InfoSoc Directive207, as only transient copies208 are created and these fall 
in the scope of exception (temporary reproductions) under Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc 
Directive209. However, not even streaming services can fully ensure that authors of works are 
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adequately paid their share of royalties. For instance, “Spotify specified that they didn’t pay 
out the royalties as they simply didn’t have the essential data to find out whose claims were 
legitimate, or even how to find the lawful right holders. Additionally, the company said that 
music industry lacked a reliable database that covered all existing music rights.“210 This 
might have prompted the company to consider blockchain technology, as it subsequently 
bought a blockchain startup Mediachain Labs to develop a database able to keep track of 
intellectual property rights.211 
Another interesting aspect of blockchain implementation is that it might enable 
pseudonymous and even anonymous authors to protect their works without sacrificing their 
privacy, as all transactions could be traced back to one public address and then provided as 
proof, e.g. for royalty purposes.212  
Nevertheless, potential implementation of blockchain technology within the IP sector 
might be hindered with enactment of new EU legislation referred to as Copyright Directive213 
proposed by the European Commission and at the time of writing subject to trilogue 
negotiations and awaiting second vote in the European Parliament.214 While the proposal has 
raised many controversies, especially relevant to blockchain is Article 13215, according to 
which every online platform operator would be required to scan user content to prevent 
infringement with IP rights before its posting which would essentially imply applying 
YouTube filtering policies to the Internet as a whole. For these reasons, Article 13 has been 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
intermediary, or (b) a lawful use of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and which have no independent economic significance, shall 
be exempted from the reproduction right provided for in Article 2.“ 
210 S. Sharmin, op. cit. no. 192, p. 14. 
211 Ibid, p. 14. 
212 T. W. Bell, ‘Copyrights, Privacy, and the Blockchain’ (2016), 42 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 439, p. 464. 
213 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM/2016/0593 final – 
2016/0280 (COD), full text available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0593.  
214 J. Vincent, ‘EU sends controversial internet copyright reforms back to the drawing board’ (2018), available at: 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/5/17535874/eu-copyright-law-article-11-13-rejected-first-vote, last accessed 19.8.2018; J. Reda, ‘EU 
copyright reform/expansion’ (2018), available at: https://juliareda.eu/eu-copyright-reform/, last accessed 19.8.2018 .  
215 Especially paragraph 1 is of crucial importance: „Information society service providers that store and provide to the public access to large 
amounts of works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users shall, in cooperation with rightholders, take measures to ensure the 
functioning of agreements concluded with rightholders for the use of their works or other subject-matter or to prevent the availability on 
their services of works or other subject-matter identified by rightholders through the cooperation with the service providers. Those 
measures, such as the use of effective content recognition technologies, shall be appropriate and proportionate. The service providers shall 
provide rightholders with adequate information on the functioning and the deployment of the measures, as well as, when relevant, adequate 





referred to as “censorship machine”. In terms of blockchain, this particular article may have 
grave consequences. As was stated above, blockchain technology gives users the freedom to 
record any data they want which means that even illegal data or data which are infringing 
third parties’ IP rights may end up immutably recorded in the blockchain ledger.216 While 
permissioned blockchains used by private entities can be regulated ex ante, requirements as 
per Article 13 of the proposal would largely affect Dapps providing data storage, such as 
above mentioned Storj or Swarm. If not completely abolish, it is ambiguous how else would 
these requirements be enforced in the environment of permissionless blockchain where no 
single centralized party effectively exercises control over the ledger.  
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4. Particular Aspects and Potential Issues 
4.1. Interoperability, Interconnectivity 
As a distributed public ledger, blockchain has the capacity to become the largest 
database of information. This feature grants the opportunity to reach further, beyond the 
boundaries of payment systems and FinTech sector. Whenever, there is a need to store large 
amounts of information in a transparent and traceable way, blockchain can become the 
foundation into which particular parts of the system are intertwined. Namely, blockchain 
could contribute to further development of wearable computing, Internet-of-Things (IoT), 
smart cars or smart homes, etc.217 The decentralized system which does not require validation 
or supervision of a trusted third party could therefore take a step further and become 
completely machine-to-machine effective without the need of human intervention for routine 
processes.  
What could this result into in practice? M. Swan brings forth some interesting ideas: 
“Some examples of interdevice micropayments could be connected automobiles automatically 
negotiating higher-speed highway passage if they are in a hurry, microcompensating road 
peers on a more relaxed schedule. Coordinating personal air delivery drones is another 
potential use case for devide-to-device micropayment networks where individual priorities 
can be balanced. Agricultural sensors are an example of another type of system that can use 
economic principles to filter out routine irrelevant data but escalate priority data when 
environmental threshold conditions (e.g., for humidity) have been met by a large enough 
group of sensors in a deployed swarm.”218 Some of these ideas may already be materializing, 
for instance, Toyota is initiating cooperation with developers which should establish an IoT 
usage-based insurance platform with the aim to reduce insurance costs and prevent fraud.219 
From another point of view, immutability and transparence together with smart 
contracts makes blockchain suitable for any kind of public database, such as ownership 
records, cadastres, commercial registers, libraries etc. Blockchain would enable maintaining 
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transparent history of transactions which could lead back to the original owner. The 
blockchain database could include numerous kinds of metadata, including ownership deeds, 
company’s articles of association and other documents relating to property or registered 
objects and entities. This would largely minimize risks of fraud and simplify procedures 
requiring proof of ownership and authentication 
4.2. Personal Data Protection 
4.2.1. EU Regulatory Development 
One of the most often discussed features of blockchain is its perhaps revolutionary 
approach towards personal data. Over the recent years, the topic of data protection has 
become more and more pressing, the primary reason being the obvious disregard of privacy 
and personal data protection principles which some large corporations have expressed when 
dealing and trading with personal data of their clients.220 With the wave of social networks 
and social media the issue only grew, namely due to popular interpretations that personal data 
contained within social networks represent property of the social network company, and in 
any case, are part of public data which should be allowed to be a subject of trading. The CJEU 
actively sought to set boundaries to such treatment of personal data and promote privacy 
principles and protection of natural persons’ rights. In one of its most famous cases from this 
area, the Google Spain case221, the CJEU articulated the right to be forgotten for the first time 
which was supposed to ensure that modern technologies like social networks or search 
engines do not retain personal data forever, without sufficient purpose and legal grounds and 
in direct contradiction of a natural person’s wishes. Within the EU, the efforts to reinforce 
data protection legal framework culminated in the enactment of the GDPR222 which 
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essentially follows the principles set by the Data Protection Directive223 but also brings forth a 
couple of new terms and obligations for data controllers and processors (such as data 
protection officer or right to portability, etc.), and more importantly, unlike the Data 
Protection Directive, the GDPR is a regulation and thus, aims to harmonize the data 
protection legislation within the whole territory of the EEA. 
4.2.2. Blockchain and Personal Data under GDPR 
What is so radical about blockchain in respect to personal data is that blockchain 
technology in principle does not require any processing of personal data in order to 
successfully function. As was already established, a user is not required to disclose his or her 
name, date of birth, account number or any other piece of personal information to be able to 
transact with any other user over the blockchain network. Public address and public key, even 
though available to all persons viewing the ledger, will generally not be considered as 
personal data under the article 4 paragraph 1 of the GDPR and in line with the CJEU’s 
reasoning in Patrick Breyer224, as on their own they do not relate to an identified or 
identifiable natural person. They can only be used to identify a natural person if they are 
connected to the specific and unique private key which, in normal circumstances225, only the 
relevant natural person disposes with. The private key, however, does fall in the scope of 
personal data and due to its connection to user’s financial resources and ability to single-
handedly identify a natural person represents a very sensitive piece of information which 
should by closely guarded. 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned, blockchain can contain other personal data apart 
from private keys, depending on the contents of the transaction. A simple, basic transaction 
for transfer or exchange of an amount of cryptocurrency will usually not include any personal 
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details, unless the interested parties wish to include them in metadata of the transaction file. 
However, with the assistance of smart contracts (see section 3.2.2 of this thesis), blockchain 
can also serve as a solution for secure file-sharing, e.g., for the purposes of transfer of smart 
property or license. There are two principal options, either (i) the electronic file itself is 
recorded and shared over blockchain, or (ii) a hash of the file is shared with or without 
enabling certain parties to reach the file itself which is stored “off-chain”. Due to the fact that 
in respect of the former option the file is accessible to everyone on the network and the ledger 
and its blocks are doomed to become much larger which will inevitably be projected to 
transaction fees and thus, may become considerably expensive, the latter option might be 
more preferable. But if, for any reason, the file itself is uploaded in the ledger, GDPR 
principles will have to be observed and the protection of contained personal data ensured. If 
possible, it is recommendable to anonymize any document which could be accessed without 
limitation from any node within the network. 
4.2.3. Digital Identity 
Due to the specific nature of the private key, there have been many projects building on 
private keys in one way or another to develop software for verification of digital entity of a 
person. We are used to verify our identity online for most of our online actions where a form 
of registration is required, regardless whether new access data are generated (username and 
password) while the identity is verified via email address, or whether the verification process 
is wired through an already established digital identity, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Gmail or 
other social media profiles. While these practices became usual, they are not the most secure 
way to verify a person’s identity, especially when there is a lot at stake, e.g., shopping online. 
This is where blockchain could help. Projects like OneName or BitID aim at facilitating a 
universal digital identity interface which could be implemented in any website requiring 
registration, in particular for eCommerce purposes but also in other areas not related to 
crypto-balance and payments.226 In order to put more layers between the user’s private key 
and the digital identifier, the software uses eWallet address of users to ensure verification. 
Instead of remembering the complicated and long eWallet address, the user can set a specific 
username – “Bithandle” which he or she uses whenever verifying identity. Due to the fact that 
                                                 
 





the Bithandle is recorded in the blockchain and linked with the user’s address, it can be easily 
traced if needed.227  
While on the one hand, these applications enable the users to have more control over 
their digital identity and ensure higher level of security than the usually centralized social 
media ever can, on the other hand, there are still some security and privacy concerns. Firstly, 
if the digital authorization software is built on eWallet software, which is likely to be 
centralized, the issue of centralization and related security risks, as described below, is 
mitigated but not completely eliminated. Secondly, even though the level of security is 
improved, having one digital identity identificator or authenticator may still entail some 
danger, in particular, under certain circumstances it may make identity theft easier. Taking 
over someone’s Facebook or Gmail identity today is still relatively easy and consequences 
range from a nuisance to some serious harm, depending on the number of connected services 
and websites. However, if we consider a scenario where the blockchain-based authenticator 
becomes the universal norm regarded as sufficiently secure way to prove digital identity and 
is used to connect to more than just eShop websites, for instance to internet banking, social 
security profiles, or health records in established eGovernment, the consequences can amount 
to a complete identity loss the actual extent of which we have grasped, so far, only within 
science-fiction movies. Therefore, even though it can be argued that private keys “are harder 
to steal” or recover against a user’s will, a potential involuntary leak or theft can lead to 
catastrophic results. 
4.2.4. GDPR Compliance 
Even if we take into account the above mentioned considerations, the data protection 
area is not completely resolved in terms of blockchain technology. Although it could be 
argued that a higher level of protection of rights and freedoms of natural persons can be 
ensured when their personal data is stored and transferred over the blockchain-based software, 
as opposed to other IT solutions, a couple of questions, in particular relating to enforcement of 
rights, have to be raised in respect of GDPR compliance.  
Firstly, it is ambiguous who should be in the position of controller of personal data 
contained in the ledger. For instance, if we consider a distributed payment system where all 
                                                 
 





nodes are equal, who should a user – a natural person – turn to if he or she wishes to exercise 
his or her rights as a data subject? Should the independent nodes be even regarded as 
processors? Under the GDPR, if personal data is included in transactions, each node should be 
considered as processing personal data, as none of the stipulated exceptions is likely to be 
applicable.  If the relevant data protection authority adopted such stance, it is likely that every 
node would then be considered a controller of personal data, or possibly all nodes would act 
as joint controllers. However, according to some authors, it is questionable whether joint 
controllership could even be applied due to the lack of clear allocation of obligations.228 It 
might be a little less ambiguous in case of permissioned (closed) blockchain system, for 
instance deployed by bank consortia, “In the latter case of [permissioned blockchain] one can 
easily imagine regulators to focus on either a technical system operator (if any, e.g., a joint 
venture set-up) or consider the group of participating entities as joint controllers”.229 
Similarly, blockchains with only a relatively small number of full nodes (for instance within 
the Lightning Network system applying side blockchain networks, see section 4.5.4 of this 
thesis) could be by analogy regarded as a closed group of joint controllers. 
Perhaps even more burning issue is the incompliance with the privacy-by-default 
principle and the physical impossibility to ensure exercise of the right to erasure of personal 
data, i.e. the right to be forgotten and similarly, the right to rectification of personal data. 
Blockchain is based on transparency and traceability – once a block is added to the chain, it 
cannot be erased or altered without consensus among nodes. “If old transactions were to be 
removed retroactively, under current [blockchain] models, the majority of all P2P connected 
nodes would have to verify again the legitimacy of every effected transaction backwards, 
unbuild the entire [blockchain] block by block and then rebuild it afterwards, with every such 
transaction step to be distributed block-wise to all existing nodes.”230 Such practice would be 
not just very impractical but also extremely time and energy consuming which leads some 
authors to believe that adequate interpretation of legitimate interest under article 6 letter f) of 
the GDPR would be necessary to include the “core functioning” of the technology.231 Other 
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potential solution might lie in anonymization232, as opposed to currently deployed 
pseudonymization233, which is regarded by some experts as equivalent to erasure.234 
It should be noted that there are many other issues which might prevent compliance 
with GDPR, such as uncontrollable transfers to third countries due to blockchains 
decentralization; however, some authors have pointed out that blockchain technology might 
have certain features which make it suitable as a tool for reaching compliance. For instance, 
blockchain could enable more granular and easier management of consent and data subjects’ 
rights, e.g., a controller could keep blockchain records of the data subjects consent in respect 
of different kinds of personal data.235 
4.3. Fight against Censorship 
Due to it decentralized nature, blockchain has been suggested as the most effective 
solution in fight against censorship, suppression of human rights and over-the-top regulation. 
In, particular, blockchain has been brought up in relation with management of “transnational 
public goods and organizations”, such as Internet or Wikipedia.236 Firstly, regulation and 
potentially even abolishment of any jurisdiction is likely to be futile in respect of blockchain 
technology, should it decide not to adhere, as there are not many options for governments to 
shut down a whole decentralized, even global network technically-wise. This could be 
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demonstrated on the Wikileaks example. Although there are opposing opinions in terms of 
legitimacy of such an instrument, it remains evident that the general public had and still has 
interest in accessing leaked information. As follows from considerations of some authors, if 
Wikileaks was on blockchain in 2010 when Edward Snowden leaked confidential information 
and the organization itself needed donations to continue with its activity, following bans on 
transactions imposed by centralized governments and financial institutions would be 
scatheless.237 
Secondly, by recording information in a permissionless blockchain, it enables anybody 
and everybody to verify its content. This aspect might be especially important in regard to 
Internet censorship and currently much discussed notion of “fake news”, i.e. incorrect or 
inaccurate news orchestrated out of propaganda and other political purposes. For instance 
ICANN, an organization managing Internet domains on the international level, could be 
effectively replaced by a decentralized equivalent which would make shutting down of 
websites in totalitarian regimes much more difficult.238 Namecoin was a cryptocurrency 
developed for these purposes.239 Therefore, blockchain can effectively fulfill what samizdat 
literature did for books of politically persecuted authors. Another example might be 
Alexandria blockchain which contains unaltered accounts of Twitter feeds.240  
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that with lack of government control, no one can 
guarantee or even remove illegal, immoral or inhumane data from blockchain either, which 
poses considerable risks namely in terms of child pornography and terrorism.241 The similar 
issue arises in relation to encrypted communication which might also be enabled by using 
blockchain technology (e.g. Whisper). This might be especially interesting with regard to the 
proposal of ePrivacy regulation242 and ongoing discussion whether government should be 
entitled to access private communication on legitimate grounds, such as fight against 
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terrorism via so-called “back doors”, technically implemented by electronic communication 
providers.243 
4.4. Security 
Personal data, especially in relation to financial resources and services, have always 
attracted attackers with the aim to overpower the systems set up for the protection of data and 
extract every piece of personal, sensitive or otherwise useful information which can then be 
either sold to interested parties or held for ransom. There are three main goals in respect of the 
security of systems processing and storing personal data which must be ensured: integrity 
(meaning that the data are not altered without permission), confidentiality (meaning that the 
data are not disclosed to unauthorized persons) and availability of data (meaning that regular 
backups are undertaken so that a copy of data is available in case of an incidental loss).244  
Over the years, data losses consisting either in incidental security breaches or hacking 
thefts have become increasingly occurring, especially with the steep rise of Internet. Big 
security scandals pertained to social networks, financial institutions or telecommunication 
operators and other service providers.245 Interestingly, financial and health sectors are 
especially sensitive in terms of ransomware. The fact that the health providers and other 
actors cannot afford to lose health data of thousands of patients makes them an easy target of 
attackers.246 Consequently, security requirements imposed by regulation and the service 
providers themselves constantly increase, e.g. deployment of cloud solutions and proficient 
risk management; however, so far, most of these services are based on pull technology 
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meaning that “the user’s personal information is on file to be pulled any time it is 
authorized”. The pull technology requires collection and storage of large amounts of data in 
data centers which essentially become centralized honeypots247, irrespective whether the 
company stores the data on its own servers or whether it procures cloud services. Honeypots 
are attracting hackers because, even though they are strongly protected, they are placed in a 
specific location and thus, the hackers can focus all their efforts and computational power on 
one place, for example for a brute force attack.  
Blockchain technology has been often proclaimed as a possible solution to these 
security breaches and risks, namely in respect of financial data and services. As opposed to 
traditional payment systems, blockchain is a push technology which lets the user initiate and 
submit information relevant for the particular transaction to the network248. Thus, the design 
of the system primarily does not require operation of large data centers; however, as the 
ledger is growing and many users are relying on the minority of full nodes to verify all 
transactions, these nodes become mining pools requiring more storage and therefore, become 
very much alike to data centers of centralized systems. 
Nonetheless, despite its reputation as a revolutionary transaction system transforming 
the way we view currency, payment and security of transactions, it should be noted that even 
though there are many perks in blockchain technology security-wise, many of these are not 
automatic and require adequate adjusting and further development. To begin with, there are 
palpable limits in regard to three above mentioned goals which should be attained to ensure 
security of data and storage systems.  
Firstly, while blockchain ledgers do ensure integrity of recorded data, as after a block is 
added to the chain it cannot be altered without enormous computational power which would 
require complicated unbuilding and rebuilding of the chain, it should be emphasized that 
blockchain “does not make inaccurate data accurate”.249 If inaccurate data passes the 
authorization process (i.e. transaction is considered true), it will be recorded in the ledger 
forever as the technology does not allow inspection of contents of recorded data.  
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Secondly, blockchain ledgers are generally open (if permissionless) and transparent 
which in its nature goes against confidentiality – whatever is recorded in the ledger (e.g. the 
addressee or value of the transaction) is accessible to everyone who is connected to the 
network. However, recent development shows that there might be a way around this issue. For 
example, by implementing so-called zero-knowledge proofs in Ethereum blockchains. This 
technology introduces public pieces of information, authenticators, which serve as a 
verification of a given fact without the necessity to actually send a document or other proof of 
such fact.250  
Finally, availability might be in some ways difficult to ensure. While the contents of a 
blockchain ledger are shared among all participating nodes which ensures that the ledger 
continues to exist even if one node is compromised or destroyed, if it is the chain itself that is 
compromised, e.g. in case of an attack, its consequent restoring again requires unbuilding and 
rebuilding which is not easy.251 
As follows, even though distributed ledgers do improve security of data systems, they 
are not “bullet proof”.252 Within last five years, there have been quite a few scandals 
involving in a security breach which resulted in loss, or better yet theft of millions of crypto-
tokens. For instance, the infamous Mt. Gox security incident occurred from 2011 until 2014 in 
Japan-based Bitcoin exchange. Although the cause of the loss of 750,000253 customers’ 
Bitcoins is still not completely resolved254, the incident eventually led to the then largest 
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Bitcoin exchange’s declaration of bankruptcy.255 Other incidents resulting in damage of lower 
amounts include for example European Bitstamp exchange hack (2015), Hong-Kong base 
Bitfinex exchange hack (2016) or attack on Ethereum’s DAO (2016), the latter one, however, 
ended up being saved by a hacking counter-attack.256 This year’s attack at a Japanese 
exchange Coincheck and consequent loss of more than USD 500 million worth of 
cryptocurrencies257 serves as a proof that incidents continue to happen which might mean that 
blockchain technology is not as secure as we were led to believe. Potentially weak spots in the 
blockchain infrastructure which might be at the root of some of the continuous incidents are 
sometimes divided into two groups: (1) issues relating to the blockchain technology itself and 
(2) issues relating to so-called supporting systems of the blockchain-based technology.258 
4.4.1. Malleability Bugs and Double-Spending 
The first group of issues is caused by the language and design of the blockchain system 
and its coding. As no code is perfect or invincible, blockchain code can be broken or 
overridden as well.259 These weaknesses enable attackers to perform double-spend attacks 
which are based on attackers’ efforts to alter an already broadcasted but not yet confirmed 
transaction and add the altered transaction to the chain before the original one (see Annex I. - 
Detailed Description of Blockchain Technology).260 The reason behind is the default setting 
of the system which is always focused on determination whether the transaction is true261, i.e. 
whether the necessary parameters are fulfilled. This lets the attackers to modify some aspects 
of the transaction while still keeping it true.262 There are, however, quite a few technical 
obstacles which make double-spend attacks less logical, namely, the attacker must be 
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connected to many nodes in the network and must dispose with sufficient computing power; 
and even if such criteria are met, blockchain is designed in such a way that it makes 
authorization process (i.e. mining) of true transactions primarily more profitable than creation 
of false ones.263 
4.4.2. 51 % Attacks 
Another issue is the possibility of majority attack or also called 51 % hash power attack. 
Unlike double-spend attacks, this practice does not presume control only over one transaction. 
The attacker must control the majority of the computing power of the whole network, thus 
51 %.264 If the control is ensured, the attacker does not have to alter a broadcasted transaction 
or race with other nodes to add the altered transaction to the chain; he or she can force the 
approval of submitted transaction by brute force without “innocent” nodes noticing. For these 
reasons, the control of the network is closely monitored within the cryptocurrency community 
and if one entity gets even close to 51 %, panic occurs.265 It should be noted that attackers are 
more likely to achieve the 51 % threshold by overpowering less secure nodes in the network 
due to the fact that each miner is free to decide and choose the used equipment and 
consequently the level of the node’s security.266 The possibility of 51 % attacks is also higher 
in any blockchain which is somewhat centralized and where “only a few large mining pools 
control the majority of the transaction recording.”267 The centralization tendency is a relevant 
factor namely in large ledgers with large amounts of recorded data where only few powerful 
nodes operate, in permissioned (closed) blockchains which however, include only known and 
verified players and should therefore, be able to mitigate the risk, and finally, certain extent of 
centralization is a result of supporting services, such as eWallets which are mostly offered by 
a centralized entities. 
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It should be noted, that due to the enormous amount of power that is necessary to take 
control of 51 % of a network, it is logical that attackers are keener to attempt such attack on a 
smaller and newer networks which do not yet encompass that many nodes and thus, less 
computational power is necessary to overpower them. Furthermore, thanks to market places 
offering mining hardware and software for rent, attackers might be able to amass large 
amounts of computational power without actually having to purchase them.268 This might 
significantly simplify and increase possibility of 51 % attacks and simultaneously make them 
more profitable for attackers. One website even tries to calculate how much would a 51 % 
attack cost, depending on the particular network269; however, according to some sources, the 
website does not take into account the actual costs of purchasing necessary computational 
power (hardware and software) and might; therefore, paint somewhat distorted image.270 The 
crucial detail in the blockchain setting which might be explored in order to prevent or at least 
deter potential attackers from any future attacks might be the number of required verifications 
by other nodes in the network necessary for a transaction to be added to the chain. For 
instance, Bitcoin Gold which was a victim of many such attacks recently increased the 
number from 5 to 50 which, so far, seems to be working.271 
In addition, some bugs in blockchain code might lead to other forms of attacks, such as 
Zerocoins case where an attacker was enabled to create and obtain large amounts of 
completely new and yet unspent coin.272   
4.4.3. Cryptography  
Lastly, attention should also be given to the cryptography method as well. Blockchain 
technology is generally based on the Elliptic Curve Cryptography which, according to some 
past predictions, might have been “crackable” by 2015273 which has obviously not been the 
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case yet, as Bitcoin continues to use the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA).274 In this regard, doubts are raised particularly in connection with quantum 
computing which can possibly generate much more computational power and may be a tool 
for breaking asymmetric cryptography which blockchain is based on.275 
4.4.4. eWallets 
The second group of issues concerns supporting technology and equipment which every 
person participating in a blockchain network needs, regardless whether it is a general user, 
miner or developer.276 One of the downfalls of a decentralized system which has no 
supervising authority is that the management and safe-keeping of private keys is left to users 
themselves. Due to the fact that private keys are essentially an illogical long set of characters 
which most people would have trouble remembering, eWallet software has been developed to 
ensure safe-keeping and user-friendly access at the same time. The eWallet services have 
many advantages, namely, if a person forgets or loses the password/handle to his or her 
eWallet, it does not automatically mean that all cryptocurrency kept in the eWallet is lost as 
well (which is the case if a person does not keep the cryptocurrency in an eWallet). This is 
due to the fact that the company providing eWallet services usually also provides customer 
service and can help recover the password and reinstate access. The drawback is that the 
company is usually based on centralized systems requiring storage of data, including private 
keys of clients, in data centers which consequently become honeypots for potential attackers. 
To mitigate this risk, many eWallet providers store clients’ private keys in “cold storage”, i.e. 
without access to Internet which ensures that they are not accessible online and should an 
attacker wish to obtain them, he or she would have to be physically present in the data 
center.277 
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The situation is similar in case of exchanges where users can trade and exchange 
cryptocurrencies for other cryptocurrencies or for fiat currencies. Although technically 
similar, as follows from provided examples, security breaches which took place at an 
exchange represent a vast majority of all cryptocurrency losses. While there might be more 
reasons, the prevailing one seems to be that while eWallet providers are usually “honest” 
companies, many exchange operators seek to obtain quick gain by speculation and 
manipulation of the crypto-market. Another reason lies in the fact that as new start-ups, these 
companies are less likely to focus its investment efforts and resources on security risks.278 As 
consequence, majority of exchanges are based on outdated and underdeveloped software 
which enables numerous attacks.279 This is not a general rule, as there are likely exchanges 
ensuring that they use and develop the best IT solutions possible, but rather a tendency which 
can be observed from reported breaches.  
It goes without saying that there are necessary requirements in respect of customer due 
diligence which should be attained. They include regular backups and updates of software, 
including the whole eWallet, secure storage (for private keys outside eWallets preferably cold 
storage), strong passwords, etc.280 
4.4.6. Consumer Protection 
Cryptocurrency and blockchain-based transaction systems are currently not suitable for 
an average consumer. Even if we disregard the financial side of trading and exchange of 
currencies and additional payment and financial services, a certain amount of IT knowledge is 
necessary to participate in the system without quickly losing all savings exchanged for 
cryptocurrency (e.g., by loss of private keys, choice of wrong exchanges, etc.)281. While many 
cryptocurrencies try to provide necessary information and even security warnings and advice 
to its clients and other interested parties, for example in relation to eWallet safe-keeping282, 
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there are yet no standards nor codes of conduct in this area. Consumer protection is one of the 
main drives and strongest arguments of those who call for regulation of blockchain and/or 
cryptocurrencies283, meaning that states should step in and define requirements and conditions 
under which provision of crypto-related services could be provided to consumers. One of the 
first states is Malta whose MPs have recently passed a set of three bills regulating 
cryptocurrencies and blockchain which also introduce a new supervisory and regulatory 
body.284 According to the Maltese government, their goal is to establish Malta as one of the 
leading jurisdictions in the area of blockchain technology.285 
4.4.7. Key Personnel 
On a separate note, the system’s basic setup in terms of “key personnel” might also be 
regarded as a potential risk. The term key personnel refers to the core developers having 
access to the altcoin’s software who decide about major updates and can propose hard forks 
which, however, require support of the majority of users.286 Firstly, “in all business 
organizations key people pose risk to the organization – they could become sick, tired, 
mentally unwell, subject to extortion or corruption. Regardless of the reason if the trust put in 
key people is ill-placed the ledger’s security and reliability are at risk.” Secondly, the 
position of influence of such persons inevitably creates tempting opportunities for personal 
gain at the expanse of the rest of the network, regardless whether it is manipulation of the 
market in regard of exchanges, investment fraud or practices similar to insider trading due to 
the fact the core developers will always dispose with more information than the rest of the 
network. This particular factor might even stand behind some of the infamous cryptocurrency 
losses that were mentioned above. For instance, Jon Montroll, founder of BitFunder exchange 
and other crypto investment platforms has recently pleaded guilty to “securities fraud and 
obstruction of justice” in front of US courts for theft of thousands of Bitcoins blamed on a 
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hack.287 Similarly, Mark Karpeles, former CEO of Mt. GOX was charged and is currently 
tried by Japanese courts for embezzlement and manipulation of data.288 Lastly, the idea of 
blockchain and related services primarily came out of frustration and concern with behavior 
and instruments of government’s centralized supervisory organizations, such as central banks. 
The power and influence that is in hands of core developers goes against that idea. Even 
though blockchain is sometimes referred to as a form of direct democracy due to the 
necessary support of majority, the key personnel is not held accountable to anyone. Unlike in 
the case of centralized authorities, so far, there are no terms, no codes of conduct, no 
supervision. In some cases, we do not even know the identities of these persons. 
4.4.8. EU Market - NIS Directive 
At the European level, the cyber security issue was addressed by the enactment of the 
NIS Directive289 which imposes obligations on defined regulated persons and services. The 
obligations particularly relate to management of security risks and reporting of security 
incidents. The first issue which needs to be resolved is whether the NIS Directive can even be 
applicable to blockchain.  
In article 4 paragraph (1) the NIS Directive provides a relatively wide definition of 
“network and information system”. Apart from obvious inclusion of electronic 
communications networks in letter (a), for the purposes of NIS Directive network/information 
system shall also be “(b) any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or 
more of which, pursuant to a program, perform automatic processing of digital data; or (c) 
digital data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by elements covered under points (a) 
and (b) for the purposes of their operation, use, protection and maintenance.” 
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Blockchain distributed ledgers may be considered a digital data stored and processed by 
a “sophisticated algorithm”290 and thus, can be deemed as falling in the scope of networks and 
information systems. However, if the NIS Directive is applicable, who should be required to 
fulfill the imposed obligations? The problem lies in the decentralization aspect of blockchain 
ledgers. As was already mentioned, all nodes connected and participating in a decentralized 
ledger are equal and none of them, not even the miners or developers’ nodes, exercise control 
of others. Thus, as there is no centralized point of control or contact, any security requirement 
following from the NIS Directive would be generally hard to enforce. To apply the NIS 
Directive, we therefore need to assess whether there are any entities or nodes in a blockchain 
which could fall in the scope of defined regulated entities, i.e. operators of essential services 
or digital service providers. 
Essential services are services which are crucial for the functioning and well-being of 
society, provided that they fall into the scope of sectors pre-defined by Annex II of the NIS 
Directive. They include for example energy, health, financial or drinking water supply and 
distribution sector. The NIS Directive then imposes obligation on providers of such services 
and on operators of networks which are fundamental for smooth running and provision of 
essential services, i.e. for instance communication system of a hospital. 
Firstly, no blockchain network in the sense of the transaction system, such as Bitcoin or 
Ethereum network is likely to be considered an essential service on its own. Since blockchain 
transaction systems are in many cases not even considered as payment instruments from the 
legal side of view, it can be concluded that they are not critical or essential for smooth 
running of state economy or well-being of society in respect of banking or financial sector291. 
Furthermore, even if it was possible to treat blockchain transaction system, such as Bitcoin, as 
a payment instrument, “it is impossible to identify who is the ‘service provider’ in the Bitcoin 
system”.292 
Secondly, the situation might be slightly different if we look at blockchain from the 
perspective of information and/or communication system supporting an essential service. 
Namely, actors in financial and banking sectors may deploy blockchain solutions to store and 
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share information. Such blockchain would, however, probably be a closed/permissioned 
blockchain with a limited number of participants. In such a case all participants, probably 
banks or commercial financial institutions, would be required to ensure that security measures 
as per article 14 of the NIS Directive are met with respect to the system – namely reporting of 
incidents. This would require cooperation, internal set of rules and division of obligations 
among the members of the permissioned blockchain. 
And thirdly, blockchain should also be assessed from the angle of digital services and 
digital service providers. The NIS Directive does not provide direct definition of digital 
services; instead it refers to article 1 paragraph 1 letter (b) of the Directive on Information 
Society services293 which defines services as “any Information Society service, that is to say, 
any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the 
individual request of a recipient of services.” Nonetheless, the NIS Directive further narrows 
this scope by referral to Annex III, thus, digital services subject to the NIS Directive, are 
limited to (1) online marketplaces, (2) online search engines and (3) cloud computing 
services.  
In this regard, first conclusion is that some blockchain-based services might be 
considered as online marketplaces. This is especially the case of cryptocurrency exchanges 
which “basically provide service to users by providing platforms enabling users to exchange 
real money [cryptocurrencies]and vice versa”.294 In such a case, they would be required to 
apply technical and organizational measures, procedures for notification of incidents and 
fulfill other obligations under the NIS Directive. 
The second conclusion is that blockchain solutions might also be considered as a form 
of cloud computing. The NIS Directive defines cloud computing as “a digital service that 
enables access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable computing resources.” 
While cloud services are currently provided almost exclusively by centralized providers 
disposing with large data centers, the same services can be provided by a (un)limited group 
connected in a network. “While the European law-maker did presumably not anticipate it, the 
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blockchain infrastructure layer is actually similar to the single service provider model from 
a functional perspective. It could thus be considered as a specific kind of cloud computing 
service where the computing resources are (i.) constituted by the network-powered platform 
(Platform as a Service or“PaaS”) and (ii.) provided and allocated according to the 
governance rules of the blockchain platform.”295 It is not clear, whether such interpretation 
would indeed be possible or whether amendment would be necessary, as the CJEU has to this 
day not yet interpreted cloud computing in its judgments. Nevertheless, if we accept such 
interpretation, the issue of pin-pointing a service provider and thus, obligated person under the 
NIS Directive remains296. If we consider that cloud computing services were to be provided 
on the basis of a permissioned blockchain, the issue can be overcome, even if with certain 
difficulties; however, should the cloud provision be based on a permissionless blockchain 
with open access (e.g. Storj, Swarm), provisions of the NIS Directive would likely not be 
enforceable under current circumstances and wording and thus, an amendment might be 
necessary to ensure the same level of security a protection. 
4.5. Capacity and Potential Scaling 
One of the often discussed issues of transaction systems based on blockchain is their 
limited capacity which is affected and caused by many factors. Firstly, regard must be given 
to the processing time of the network. If we take Bitcoin as a representative of 
cryptocurrencies, namely due to its ubiquity and popularity, the processing time of a 
transaction within the Bitcoin network is at average 7 minutes while the network is updated 
every 10 minutes297. As opposed to traditional payment systems which usually take hours or 
even days to process a payment order and complete a transaction, the time necessary for the 
completion of transaction, i.e. addition of new block to the chain, is measured in seconds, 
however, the preceding step consisting in verification of the transaction by a pre-defined 
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number of nodes298 connected to the network called mining (further described in Annex I. - 
Detailed Description of Blockchain Technology) requires more time, mostly depending on 
the size of the block. In other words, the bigger the file, the longer it takes to verify the 
transaction as true. For these reasons, Bitcoin network limits the maximum size of a block to 
1 MB of data299. 
If we disregard limitations applied by banks and payment providers in respect to the 
transacted amount, i.e. value of transaction, no other limits are present in the traditional 
payment systems. This difference is mirrored in the manner how the transactions fees are 
calculated. Namely, Bitcoin systems follow the rule – the bigger the file, the higher the 
transaction fee, while traditional payment providers derive the amount of their fees from the 
value of the respective transaction.300 The existing abyss in terms of capacity between Bitcoin 
and traditional payment providers, such as Visa, can be further demonstrated if we take into 
account the number of transactions processed per second. With 200 million transactions per 
day, Visa system can process 2,300 transactions per second on average (while up to 56,000 
transactions per second can be processed at maximum). Bitcoin, on the other hand, currently 
processes 280,000 transactions on daily basis which means that only 7 transactions are 
processed per second. 301 The difference seems enormous.  
 If we continue to regard Visa as a representative of traditional payment providers, we 
can see that in its case, any issue relating to capacity, can be resolved relatively easily. Due to 
its being a centralized system controlled by a very narrow circle of persons/entities, it is not 
difficult to ensure more computing power by reinforcing the nodes in the network with more 
powerful computers. Bitcoin, on the other hand, is a distributed ledger, decentralized network 
of computers with different computing power and no authority to order use of specific 
hardware and software which might ensure more computing power. Every node in the 
network is  free to decide which hardware and software it chooses, provided that it enables 
running of the whole system, which is obvious if we take into account hard forks and different 
versions of essentially one blockchain system (for example Ethereum and Ethereum Classic). 
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4.5.1. Shortening of Processing Time 
Nonetheless, the majority of experts insists that Bitcoin’s capacity can be increased and 
thus, that the decentralized payment system can accept and process more transactions.  The 
more obvious solution might be the shortening of the processing time by making the problem 
which the nodes have to solve easier and less computing power consuming. However, that 
would lead to higher risks of hacker attacks and double-spend attacks and would effectively 
weaken the system302. If the decentralized payment system loses security as one of its 
strongest features, it also loses most of the advantages that it has over traditional centralized 
systems and essentially becomes useless.   
4.5.2. Increase of Block Size 
The other approach to increasing Bitcoin’s capacity is to increase the size of blocks. 
This, however, also has certain downfalls. Firstly, when connecting to network, the user 
downloads the complete history of the ledger up to the Genesis block. Currently, that means 
more than 110+ GB of data.303 “An alternative to becoming a full node is to download 
simplified payment verification (SPV) software. SPV software does not verify the entire 
transaction history; instead it relies on other full nodes for its verification. SPV software can 
be installed on smartphones, and is the most common way to use Bitcoin.”304 For the purpose 
of better user experience, the SPV software informs the user only of relevant information, 
such as completion of verification of transaction – addition of new block or balance on the 
user’s address.305  
By enlarging the blocks in the chain, the complete ledger of transactions would become 
exponentially larger, and therefore, a user wishing to become full node capable of mining 
would need to fulfill more demanding requirements in respect of employed hardware and 
software.306 Eventually, most users would opt for SPV solution and the mining would be left 
to a few nodes powerful enough to “do all the work”. Apart from increased likelihood of 
attacks, this would likely lead to centralization of the distributed payment systems to some 
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extent which may be viewed as honeypots of decentralized systems; and again the whole 
concept might be jeopardized. For these reasons, it has been discussed whether the full nodes 
in the network should be additionally rewarded307, so as to provide incentive. Should the 
majority of full nodes decide that the particular blockchain network means more problems 
than advantages, the whole system would crumble. This strong dependence on full nodes 
raises concerns not just in respect of centralization, but also stability of currencies and relating 
payment systems.  
4.5.3. Bitcoin Unlimited 
It may seem that there is no feasible way to increase Bitcoin’s capacity without 
weakening some of its strong suits. Bitcoin Unlimited takes the plunge and tries to remake 
one of the downfalls into an advantage, or at least less of a problem. It removes the limit on 
block size and lets the interested parties decide which of the objectives is more important and 
how much they wish to gamble, based on the “miner’s fear of losing the block reward due to 
an orphaned block”. The rate of orphaned blocks is likely to be higher if the blocks are bigger 
because by the time one big block is duly verified and added to the chain, a couple of smaller 
blocks may already be added. In accordance with the longest chain principle this would mean 
that the bigger the block, the more likely it is to be orphaned in which case the miner that 
verified it does not receive any reward, be it the transaction fee or a sliver of newly created 
Bitcoin. Bitcoin Unlimited therefore allows the mining nodes themselves to decide what risk 
in respect of the size of blocks is acceptable to them.308 They might feel more comfortable to 
take the risk of bigger blocks if they dispose with more capable equipment (such as stronger 
internet connection) which would enable them to solve the problem more quickly. This is in 
turn connected to inevitable centralization of the system where only big nodes with immense 
computing power would be capable of processing big blocks and would thus earn all 
rewards.309 If that was the case, it is questionable whether Bitcoin would even be still 
considered as a peer-to-peer payment system, or whether these powerful nodes would become 
something alike centralized authorities which require trust. 
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4.5.4. Lightning Network 
 Another idea was brought forward by a Bitcoin upgrade called Segregated Witness 
which is more modest in terms of the block size increase and sets the limit to 1.6 – 2 MB. 
Essentially, this upgrade aims to enable users to transact privately on a separate network – 
side chain (called the Lightning Network) without relying on the whole Bitcoin network while 
using a method similar to security deposit or letter of credit in traditional payment systems. 
The transaction is mostly kept private between the two nodes; however, the Bitcoin network 
and all its nodes remain a possibility in case of an issue with the transaction. In other words, 
the Bitcoin network becomes something similar to a settlement or arbitration instrument. If 
the respective opposing party causes a problem or tries to prevent the user from collecting its 
due amount, the user is always allowed to broadcast the transaction within the whole Bitcoin 
network and subsequently can collect the opposing party’s deposit. Particular advantage 
represents the level of privacy which the users may enjoy. If all interested parties are satisfied, 
the transaction never has to be broadcasted in the public ledger. “The possibility to connect 
bidirectional payment channels with each other will enable an off-chain payment network, 
and estimates show that if users broadcast three transactions per year onto the main Bitcoin 
network, then the Bitcoin ecosystem would be able to serve 35 million users with a 1 MB 
block size.”310  
In general, creation of side chains which would be connected to the main chain and 
would be able to broadcast a transaction in case of a problem especially makes sense in regard 
to blockchains used for machine-to-machine communication (e.g. DAPs, DAOs) or IoT which 
require storing of large amounts of data and deployment of micropayments.311 M. Swan 
suggests that different kinds of specialized blockchains would need to be developed for 
different kinds of services and communication: “Maybe there could be daily purchase 
blockchains for the grocery store and coffee shop purchases, and others for large-ticket items 
like real estate and automobiles. More stridently different functionality is needed for 
noneconomic-market blockchains, for government services, intellectual property registration, 
notary services, science activities, and health-record keeping. The key question is 
distinguishing the economic principles needed for the different range of functions with which 
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blockchain technology could be helpful. However, not every operation is one of value 
registration and exchange.” Another advantage of side chains is that they can be quarantined, 
i.e. a potential attack or breach of a side chain does not have to automatically affect all blocks 
and data recorded in the whole blockchain. 
4.6. Energy Consumption 
What makes blockchain technology demanding energy-wise is the process of mining, 
especially the proof-of-work method which requires the mining nodes to spend enormous 
computational power to find a solution for difficult mathematical problems. This aspect has 
been labeled as wasting of energy, namely in terms of protection of environment and 
sustainable development.312 Some studies from 2016 have compared the then spent energy to 
20 % of an average nuclear power plant313, while some predict that by 2020 the energy 
consumption will be equal to that of the whole country of Denmark.314 The enormous 
amounts of energy that are required for mining have resulted in creation of specialized mining 
pools comprising of warehouses filled with specialized hardware and placed in convenient 
geographic places with low costs of electricity, e.g. China, which in turn increases security 
risks related to such centralization.315  
There have been two major proposals of solution of this issue. Firstly, some have 
suggested that another more energy preserving method of verification should be implemented. 
For instance, proof-of-stake is based on the node’s amount of already mined cryptocurrency 
and relating interest in well-functioning of the network which then allows implementation of 
voting process instead of energy-consuming solving of problems. Ethereum will reportedly 
switch from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake with its Casper update.316  
The second proposal tries to use the spent energy for other purposes, i.e. to give the 
mathematical problems of proof-of-work method another, more useful purpose. For example, 
CureCoin implements problems based on folding proteins which can help find a cure for 
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cancer, Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s disease.317 Primecoin also uses spent computational power 
for scientific purposes, in particular for discovering special number chains318 which are 
important in many scientific fields, e.g., in physics.319 
4.7. Illegal Activities and Anti-Money Laundering Regulation  
Cryptocurrencies, and especially Bitcoin, have often been brought up in relation with 
illicit activities which might have been one of the factors preventing widespread adoption, as 
a large portion of general public has gained an impression that cryptocurrencies are 
commonly issued and used by criminals. Nonetheless, while there have been instances of 
criminal exploitation of crypto-technology, so far, there is no evidence that cryptocurrencies 
have been purposefully issued by organized crime for financing of criminal activities.320 To 
provide context necessary for determining the extent of criminal activity within crypto-
market, blockchain’s potential uses for different kinds of crime will be briefly assessed.  
Blockchain does have some properties which might be convenient for commission of 
criminal acts. Firstly, it is strictly pseudonymous and if an individual does not disclose the 
private key, it is generally very difficult to trace transactions to one particular natural person. 
Even more so, if the individual uses additional techniques like masking of IP address (VPN), 
mixing service321 or creation of number of public addresses, it makes identification and 
traceability even less feasible. Secondly, deployment of smart contracts decreases the 
necessity of direct contact between criminals (e.g., principal and agent) while at the same time 
eliminating trust and ensuring that both parties hold up their end of the bargain. Consequently, 
deployment of smart contracts for criminal acts like leakage of government secrets, 
assassination or theft of private information might increase the likelihood that the crime will 
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be successful.322 Additionally, the interaction between criminal parties is even more 
simplified with deployment of decentralized encrypted communication which cannot be 
traced back to them, such as above mentioned Whisper. 
In particular, one of the crimes that Bitcoin was used for was operation of illegal 
marketplaces, especially the most famous one – the Silk Road. Silk Road was a marketplace 
of dark web323 which could only be accessed in a specified manner and which served as an 
intermediary for sale of drugs, illegal weapons, forged official documents (e.g., passports), 
etc.324 The only currency which could be used for payment for purchases was Bitcoin. Even 
though relatively anonymous itself, the operators designed a system of further covering up of 
transaction traces, so-called “tumbling” which involves in creation of fake transactions to 
divide large amounts of currency into a series of smaller ones. Furthermore, any 
communication was wired through a number of separate servers to cover the location of 
origin.325 As a result, the transactions were untraceable and the illegal trade thrived. The Silk 
Road326 operated roughly from 2011 to 2012 until US FBI managed to gain control of one 
server and consequently dismantle internal organization.327 Its founder, Ross Ulrich was 
arrested and consequently sentenced for life imprisonment, however, not many other criminal 
actors engaging in the Silk Road’s trade activities were successfully arrested, namely due to 
enhanced anonymity that the marketplace provided.328  
Similar techniques of anonymity and non-traceability, such as tumbling and encrypted 
communication are used for other types of crypto-related crimes. In particular, in the past 
Bitcoin has been used for ransomware which implies theft of personal or sensitive data and 
consequent demand for ransom in cryptocurrency to ensure that the transaction cannot be 
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traced back to the criminal.329 An example from 2015330 involved in malware spread via spam 
and after encryption of data on a device was conducted, the data was not released until a 
crypto-ransom was paid. In a similar manner, in 2012 US presidential candidate Mitt Romney 
was a victim of ransomware in relation to his past tax reports which the hacker threatened to 
publish.331 
Allegedly, cryptocurrencies have also been targeted by terrorist organizations. The most 
commonly known case included Islamic State (ISIL) supporters requesting donations of other 
supporters in Bitcoins. However, adoption of cryptocurrencies by terrorist organizations is not 
as widespread and common, as we might be led to believe. “This situation may well change in 
the future, however, if non-state actors feel they have more to gain—politically, economically, 
or operationally—by moving toward increased [virtual currency] usage.“332  
Finally, cryptocurrencies can be used for money laundering and tax evasion. Money 
laundering implies any kind of hiding and covering of true, illegal source of money. Tax 
evasion includes hiding traces of money in order to not have to report respective revenues to 
the tax office. Due to fact that both of crimes deploy similar practices, they will be assessed 
together. The main issue of investigation authorities is that if there are no traces, no 
documentation, no proof which would establish a link between a natural person and a 
particular sum of money, there is no crime.333As was already stated, there are numerous 
techniques which, if properly executed, can ensure that transactions will not be traced back to 
their origin or to the receiving party. An example includes cryptocurrency exchange Liberty 
Reserve which was established for money laundering purposes but which was a centralized 
entity.334 On the other hand, some experts believe that crypto-markets are currently simply not 
big enough to make money laundering practices attractive.335 In respect of tax evasion, it 
might be slightly different. Large-scale tax evasion usually requires so-called tax havens with 
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banks which usually impose very strict criteria on bank secrecy.336 The elimination of need 
for banks, centralized institutions which, even if mitigated, entail some risks, might make 
blockchain very suitable for tax evasion.337  
Taking into account the above mentioned, it is logical that European institutions took 
steps to prevent and minimize the potentials of criminal activities associated with 
cryptocurrencies. While one approach is abolition, such decision would be detrimental to 
future development of modern technologies, namely in respect of financial services, and more 
importantly, it is not clear whether it would even be possible to truly abolish such 
decentralized technology.  
In 2014 the EBA called for inclusion of cryptocurrency exchanges and eWallet 
providers in the scope of obliged persons under the anti-money laundering framework due to 
the fact that these entities are in a position of „gateways“ and have access to information 
relating to transactions while at the same time being centralized and capable of being a single 
point of contact. In 2016, after terrorist attacks in France, the European Commission 
initiated338 negotiations for drafting of the AMLD4339. However, the recommendation of the 
EBA was in the end not implemented in the AMLD4, and while some Member States, e.g. the 
Czech Republic, voluntarily followed the recommendation and included crypto-providers 
within the implementation process, in line with Article (4) of the AMLD4340; at the EU level, 
exchanges and eWallet providers have not yet been included. 
Eventually, the European Commission realized the error and submitted a proposal of 
AMLD5 which, among other things, adds crypto exchanges and eWallet providers in the list 
of obliged persons under the directive, with two important specifications. Firstly, 
cryptocurrency exchanges which trade only in cryptocurrency, i.e. do not provide services of 
exchange for fiat currency, do not supposedly fall in the scope of the definition in line with 
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recital (9) of the AMLD5 which acknowledges that the regulation does have limits.341 
Secondly, the AMLD5 pertains only to “custodian wallet providers“, meaning only those 
eWallet services which exclusively keep their clients‘ private keys which, however, is not the 
only possible way of provision of eWallet services.342 The AMLD5 was adopted on 19 April 
2018 and came into effect on 7 July 2018. Member States have until January 2020 to 
implement its requirements.343  
Under the AMLD5, the above defined crypto-providers will be obliged to register in 
line with Article 47(1) of the AMLD5. As follows from the wording of the provision, the 
registration will not require licensing procedure; therefore, Member States will only be 
required to maintain lists of crypto-providers operating on their territory, provided that these 
entities are established on a centralized basis. 
In compliance with Article 11 of the AMLD, the crypto-providers will have to fulfill 
customer due diligence obligations, not only at the time of establishment but also during the 
course of commercial relationship. Due diligence, also referred to as know-you-customer 
principle (KYC) under Article 13 AMLD5 implies inter alia, identification of the customer344 
and its beneficial owner(s) and political status, if applicable, purpose and nature of the 
relationship (e.g. risk profile) and ongoing monitoring of suspicious transactions (e.g. without 
economic purpose, unusually large and/or complex, etc.). In this regard, in line with Article 
33 AMLD5 crypto-providers will also have to retain necessary information, report suspicious 
transactions and cooperate with financial investigation units of Member States and provide 
information, if and as requested. 
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Finally, under Article 8 of the AMLD they will be obliged to establish internal control 
and risk assessment and management policies and procedures pertaining to a wide ragnge of 
risks, such as customers, countries of origin or destination of transaction, nature of services, 
etc. 
According to a recent study345, 68 % of cryptocurrency exchanges and eWallet 
providers currently fail to implement satisfying background checks and KYC measures to 
meet the requirements of the AMLD5. 
It should also be noted, that in case that ICO entities are qualified as falling in the scope 
of issuers of financial instruments and thus, triggering application of the MiFID, they will 
have to ensure compliance with the AMLD5 as well. This conclusion follows from the 
ESMA’s warning to firms, according to which ICO entities might be qualified as financial 
institutions under the AMLD5.346  
4.8. Volatility 
While legal qualification of cryptocurrencies is mostly not clear, they do represent 
value, even if prone to volatility. The issue might not be that obvious if we regard 
cryptocurrencies as a means of exchange in day-to-day transactions, as persons and entities 
may tend to immediately convert them into fiat currencies347, but it becomes apparent if they 
are viewed as an investment instrument which should be able to store value relatively 
stably.348 
Sometimes extreme volatility349 of cryptocurrency prices is the reason why crypto-
technologies have many opponents on one hand, who see it as a flaw which will inevitably 
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cause failure of Bitcoin350. And on the other hand, many supporters who view the instability 
of market as an opportunity to gain profit. The most obvious reason of volatility is the 
decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies which principally excludes possibility of external 
influence and manipulation of market. However, neither is this the sole reason, nor is it an 
absolute without exceptions. Bitcoin will be used as an example for the following assessment. 
As follows from Figure 2 below, Bitcoin’s exchange rate has been relatively stable in 
the past, as opposed to more recent development. The prices revolved around $300, with the 
exception of the spike in 2013, which was caused by the Cyprus banking crisis.351 
Nonetheless, with wider adoption and rather positive approaches of many jurisdictions, the 
price quickly recovered.  
Figure 3 displays how the price of Bitcoin changed over the last year, whereas Figure 4 
depicts the change in the price of Bitcoin in the last three months.  
 
Figure 2 - Bitcoin (USD) Price (July 2010 - Aug 2018) 
 
Source: (Coindesk), own figure processing 
                                                 
 
350 See M. Farrel, ‘Strategist predicts end of Bitcoin’ (2013), available at: https://money.cnn.com/2013/05/14/investing/bremmer-
bitcoin/index.html, last accessed 19.8.2018.  


















Figure 3 - Bitcoin (USD) Price (Aug 2017 - Aug 2018) 
 
Source: (Coindesk), own figure processing 
 
Figure 4 - Bitcoin (USD) Price (May 2018 - Aug 2018) 
 























In 2012 the ECB352 considered 5 major factors which affect the price volatility. Firstly, 
it is the supply of money and other issuer’s actions. As was stated above, Bitcoin is an 
example of cryptocurrency with fixed money supply. This means that when the total amount 
of Bitcoins is mined, approximately in 2140, there will not be a possibility to issue more in 
case it is needed.353 Fixed supply has a deflationary effect. It might cause the price to continue 
to grow, provided that public’s demand will grow as well, and it may due to the growth of 
price, which in turn causes the decrease of all other prices in general. In the end it might even 
lead to deep economic crisis.354 While according to some authors, deflationary effect is to 
some extent natural and could be balanced by opposing economic effects present on crypto-
markets355, national central banks usually artificially prevent growth of value of currency in 
fear of crisis. Any kind of interventionist monetary policy in time of crisis is simply 
impossible with Bitcoin.356 Nonetheless, certain actions of core developers and key personnel 
may have similar effects, namely due to the fact that in the end they decide how the system 
will be upgraded and what kind of fork will be implemented. These decisions strongly 
influence users’ demand for the cryptocurrency and consequently, its price.357  
Secondly, according to the ECB, the market volatility is also caused by the size of the 
network358, i.e.  smaller currencies with fewer users exhibit stronger volatility and vice versa. 
Such conclusion is also supported by economists – as long as users do not conduct economic 
calculations in Bitcoins, i.e. do not grow accustomed to it similarly to traditional currencies, 
Bitcoin cannot fully stabilize.359 
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Third factor is the level of trust of the general public which the cryptocurrency can 
generate and based on the opinion of the ECB. It mainly depends on cryptocurrency’s 
“institutional conditions”, i.e. internal settings, transparent polities, etc.360  
Fourth aspect is the issuer’s reputation. Lastly, fifth factor involves in speculative 
practices and attack scandals generally connected to cryptocurrencies.361  
While the above mentioned are certainly valid factors which do affect frequent spikes of 
Bitcoin’s value, there seem to be other circumstances not included by the ECB. In particular, 
ambiguous regulatory environment across various jurisdictions does not help stabilizing the 
market. Although there are different approaches in terms of legal qualification and the extent 
of necessary regulation, it seems that similarly, as different jurisdictions take time to follow 
and observe the evolution of crypto-market before enacting any specific rules and procedures, 
the market itself will need time to adapt to these different stances and crystallize into a norm. 
In this regard, as a relatively new and small market, the crypto-market also exhibits high 
sensitivity to media outlets and slightest changes of public and especially government 
opinions. Consequently, the size of the market, the number of users and this sensitivity are an 
easy target for those who intend and are in the position to manipulate the market for personal 
gain, e.g. via insider information following ICOs, etc. 
Simple solution to the volatility issue, which is often proposed, is to change the supply 
policy.362 While it should be possible to force a hard fork of the system to this effect, it might 
end in catastrophic results in terms of user support. It is clear that fixed supply was something 
that was intended by Satoshi Nakamoto from the very beginning, likely with the intention to 
approximate Bitcoin to gold and differentiate it from traditional currencies strictly controlled 
by governments. The purpose of Bitcoin was to be free, independent of external influences. 
While this proves to be unattainable, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are increasingly 
adopted by wider population in spite of their volatility and numerous warnings by government 
authorities. Apart from speculation and lowered transaction costs, one of the reasons might be 
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that even if unstable, in some cases, cryptocurrencies prove to be capable of storing value 
more that some traditional currencies, such as Venezuelan bolívar.363 
Another suggested solution is pegging the Bitcoin (or other cryptocurrencies) to one 
traditional currency. It should be noted that in such case, the cryptocurrency would be 
dependent on all factors influencing the value of the traditional currency, such as government 
decision-making or international relations, as traditional currencies are not fully independent 
either. 364 While this solution cannot work in connection with fixed supply, some view it as a 
compromise and potential future development which might be useful for all cryptocurrencies 
in times of crisis.365 Recently established EURS might serve as an example of crypto-EUR 
relation. Its issuers hope to fulfill all requirements of Maltese new regulation package.366 
4.9. RegTech and Corporate Solutions 
Unlike FinTech sector, RechTech companies do not want to compete with financial 
institutions; instead their business model is aimed at development of solutions for financial 
and other regulated entities in order to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.367 
The primary reason is the cost-saving. According to Santander, “blockchain technology could 
reduce banks’ infrastructure costs by USD 20 billion annually.”368  
Blockchain technology, especially in its permissioned form which is more suitable for 
sensitive financial data, could be beneficial in respect of all requirements based on client 
identification, screening and transaction monitoring.369 Clients could be generated digital 
identities, including their ownership shares and interests which would then help identify 
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ultimate beneficial owners and report suspicious transactions. These requirements are usually 
referred to as know-your-customer (KYC) principle and are the basis of many regulations, 
such as AMLD5 or PSD2.370 A peculiar fact should be emphasized – while it is not clear how 
permissionless blockchain as a FinTech solution may fulfill regulatory requirements, 
interestingly, permissioned RechTech version is suitable to be used as a tool for complying 
with the same requirements.  
Furthermore, as the regulated institutions are in some instances required to share data371, 
projects based on closed blockchains with authenticated participants that can create their own 
private blockchains may serve as a solution. In order to ensure sufficient protection of privacy 
and sensitive information372, the common blockchain can contain only reference data and 
subsequently serve as a dispute settlement instrument.373 An example might be the 
Hyperledger project with IBM as the leader of development which ensures “confidentiality, 
transparency, flexibility and scalability.”374 International interbanking system SWIFT has 
announced that it will initiate a trial using Hyperledger within the platform.375  
Blockchain has also a range of options in the corporate governance, namely as was 
stated above, blockchain can simplify shareholder decision-making (remote general meeting), 
and also can monitor company stock distribution and transactions for the accounting and 
auditing purposes.376 If implemented, it could mitigate risks of insider trading and hostile 
takeovers.377 
4.10.  Social and Psychological Obstacles 
Perhaps the least heavy but still significant obstacle standing in the way of mass 
adoption of blockchain-based currencies, applications and other technologies is the general 
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feeling that blockchain represents something far too complicated and alien for an average 
person. Indeed, the peer-to-peer transaction system based on encryption, private keys and 
fairly volatile tokens of value has mostly not yet become very user-friendly, even though a 
basic human error while handling the system may lead to grave consequences. Public and 
especially private keys represent crucial pieces of information which, if lost, lead to loss of 
access to the crypto-balance. A person averagely acquainted with computer technology does 
not anticipate that he or she will be required to memorize a particularly long illogical set of 
letters and numbers serving as something like a password, in order to access his or her 
financial resources. Yes, as a society we have grown more accustomed to more demanding 
criteria in terms of log-ins, passwords and other access data, namely in connection with 
internet banking; however we can rest assured that if we by any chance forget a part of our 
access data, there will always be someone who will help us recover them or change them.  
This role has traditionally been assigned to banks and other financial institutions 
watching over our savings. No such role is present in blockchain-based systems. While the 
solution, to a certain degree, might lie in eWallet software, two additional issues are 
connected. Firstly, some access data has to be established in order to secure the eWallet itself, 
thus users will inevitably have to memorize some data, albeit chosen by them (if we set aside 
the possibility of access by a fingerprint378). Secondly, eWallet in principle represents 
centralization and as such might raise security issues.  
Nonetheless, there are already companies, such as Circle Internet Financial or Xapo 
coming up with ideas “with the goal of being the ‘Gmail of Bitcoin’ in terms of frontend 
usability - and market share”.379  
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The decentralized nature of blockchain is the main reason why it is difficult to 
categorize blockchain even though networks are generally nothing new for any given legal 
system. This applies especially to permissionless blockchains which, under normal 
circumstances, cannot be controlled by any centralized entity. This aspect will pose problems, 
regardless whether the blockchain-based solution is used as e.g. payment service or IP rights 
management solution. 
I have shown in this master’s thesis that the first major obstacle standing in way of 
future mass adoption of blockchain technology is its legal definition. Although 
cryptocurrencies are only a part of the whole blockchain concept, their volatility and use for 
investment purposes makes them particularly sensitive in terms of consumer protection which 
consequently triggers the attention of regulators. I have presented the opinions of Member 
States and EU institutions which are not always conclusive. Namely, the CJEU’s reasoning in 
the Hedqvist case will likely have further consequences for legal qualification of 
cryptocurrency in individual Member States. Moreover, with the newest enactment of the 
AMLD5 and conclusion of some crypto-providers in the scope of obliged persons, we can 
anticipate more CJEU judgments and further development in terms of legal qualification and 
subsequent related regulatory framework. However, as I have demonstrated, even if 
permissionless blockchains are considered as payment instruments, application of PSD2 will 
be difficult, as due to the decentralized nature, there are essentially no specific payment 
providers. It is thus more likely that unless relevant authorities decide to ban permissionless 
blockchain altogether, cryptocurrencies and related services and instruments will remain 
unregulated to a large extent.  
In terms of smart contracts, I have established that it would not be simple to implement 
them as true contracts within the traditional principles of contract law. In particular, parties to 
a smart contract will face difficulties should they request judicial review. Apart from obvious 
concerns which lie in the court’s inability to read code or evidentiary complications, I expect 
that many legal researchers will focus on the jurisdiction problem in the near future.  
From the presented overview of ten particular aspects of blockchain, in my opinion, 
most regard will have to be given to the security issue and protection of personal data which 
are the two areas that need considerable development to be considered safe and compliant 





(eurozone) Member State adopts a cryptocurrency as its legal tender. In such areas, it might 
be more efficient and convenient if a common action is taken at the European level.  
On the other hand, I have shown that many concerns which are nowadays most 
discussed, such as the volatility, capacity or energy consumption and which are certainly 
important, seem to be gradually getting resolved on their own, as the market grows, or by 
developers and enthusiasts alike due to the open source nature of the code. Therefore, some 
issues like the latter group will not require the regulators to step in.  
Whatever the future development and approach of European and Member States’ 
legislators might be, I believe that blockchain should only be regulated on the basis of the 
particular utilization and purpose and not as a technology in general. While I agree with 
opinions of EU institutions that cryptocurrencies and other blockchain services and 
instruments may pose grave risks and even graver consequences, over-the-top regulation in 
fear of such consequences would lead to hindering and detriment of new and exciting 
technology that can considerably improve and simplify the way we manage not just 
businesses but even our daily lives. Thus, the current stance taken by the majority of 
stakeholders in the EU which can be described as wait-and-see-and-step-in-if-necessary might 





Annex I. - Detailed Description of Blockchain Technology 
Blockchain technology manages to overcome the General’s Problem by way of complex 
mathematical problems which the computers participating in the blockchain – the nodes, seek 
solution for. The solution to these problems requires substantial computing power. The 
potential traitor or an attacker wishing to corrupt the recorded information would have to 
possess the majority of the computational power of the entire network of nodes to be 
successful with its attack. It is easier for the engaged nodes to trust each other, therefore, not 
requiring assistance of a third trusted party anymore, thus the designation trustless.380 
That also brings us to the difference between a centralized and decentralized ledger. The 
decentralized or distributed ledger means that all nodes “are connected with each other and 
store all data simultaneously, and together constitute the common ledger. [It] requires 
consensus of those nodes rather than just the confirmation by one hierarchically structured 
storage device, as with a centralized ledger.”381 Truly decentralized systems do not 
differentiate between vertical and horizontal connection, there is no entitled party charged 
with supervision and control. All participating nodes have equal positions and value in 
reaching the consensus. There is, however, an exception to this rule. As opposed to the 
described truly decentralized systems (also called permissionless because not one of the 
engaged nodes is entitled to give permission), there may also be blockchain systems which are 
centralized to a certain degree – “permissioned” blockchains. Such blockchain ledgers allow 
for concentration of power where “a limited group of actors retain the power to access, check 
and add transactions to the ledger”.382 Permissioned blockchains do not need to provide 
incentives in order to “stay relevant” and functioning; instead, they enable access only to 
trusted nodes which have other than purely economic interest in the blockchain’s 
functioning.383 In practice, this approach will be especially interesting to banks or 
governmental entities wishing to retain some control over the recording process, in particular, 
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in case of very sensitive data. An example of such blockchain protocol of “trusted parties” is 
Ripple. These trusted parties are then known as “validation nodes”384. 
1. Verification Process 
In order to be able to comprehend how the consensus between participating nodes is 
reached and therefore, how the blockchain technology really works, the process of recording 
of transactions need to be briefly described from the technical point of view. Due to the fact 
that Bitcoin was the first successful cryptocurrency project, and so far, is the most widely 
accepted and used cryptocurrency, the following description of how the crypto transactions 
are made is based on the Bitcoin system. 
Firstly, every computer which wants to engage in a blockchain transaction must 
download the software containing a full and updated copy of the blockchain ledger. 
Therefore, every participating computer has access to all data recorded in the blockchain 
ledger up to the first recorded transaction. The ledger is viewable via the Internet385, is 
constantly updated, at regular intervals of 10 minutes386, and every change of the record is 
automatically known to all computers participating in this de facto network. Consequently, 
any file which is to be recorded in the ledger is compressed to a 64-character code called the 
hash.387 The hash is like the file’s fingerprint, it is unique for the particular file, i.e. package 
of information, and no two hashes (made from different files) are the same. Moreover, even 
though one file can be transformed in multiple copies of hashes, the file’s hash cannot be 
transformed back to the file; it is not reversible. As the next step, the compressed hash of the 
file is given a time stamp and then inserted to be recorded. Provided that the operation 
consists in a simple payment transaction without deployment of smart contracts, the file itself 
is never submitted to the ledger, it stays in the original computer.  
To be registered in the ledger, the transaction needs to be firstly accepted as true and 
validated by a pre-defined number of nodes. The transaction is true or legitimate, if e.g. “the 
                                                 
 
384 D. A Zetsche and coll., op. cit. no. 188, p. 12. 
385 M. Swan, op. cit. no. 38, p. 2: blockchains can be viewed via the „block explorers“, specialized internet sites, such as 
www.blockchain.info for the Bitcoin blockchain. 
386 H. M. Botos, ‘A Blockchain Intelligence Analysis’ (2017), 13 Res. & Sci. Today 42. 





request comes from the authorized person, the house seller has not already sold the house, 
and the buyer has not already spent the money388”. For this determination, two separate 
mathematical methods have been developed. The more usual one is the so-called proof-of-
work and it basically consists in a mathematical operation, a problem which the computers on 
the blockchain compete to solve. Each transaction proposes a new problem and the first 
computer to solve it, is subsequently rewarded, apart from the transaction fee, usually by a 
sliver of the newly made blockchain’s cryptocurrency. The remaining nodes of the system 
then verify that the solution is correct389. Once an adequate number of computers390 confirm 
the solution to the problem, the transaction is accepted as true and then recorded in the block 
of transactions which is linked to previous blocks of transactions. As such, they form a long 
chain of blocks of transactions going all the way back to the first recorded transaction – the 
genesis block391. While the designated amount is transferred immediately, it takes 
approximately 7 minutes for simple and low-amount transactions to be verified through the 
described process of problem solving. The process is called mining and is used in most 
blockchain protocols, such as Bitcoin, for example. The miners offer their computing power 
for the solution of problems and therefore, validation of transactions. In exchange, they obtain 
a portion of transaction fees and some of them, the one solving the problem first, a portion of 
the newly created token of cryptocurrency as well. These rewards serve as an incentive to 
ensure that sufficient number of computers keep performing the necessary mathematical 
operations. “Without a community of nodes running the protocol and verifying transactions 
the system stops working. If all the members have moved to a new system all data stored on 
the blockchain cease to exist.”392 Therefore, the lack of interest would inevitably entail the 
destruction of the whole decentralized system.  
The second method of validation, the proof-of-stake, is based on the “relevance” of 
participating computers. The determination of which computer will be charged with 
                                                 
 
388 P. Boucher and coll., op. cit. no. 41, p. 5. 
389 M. Atzori, op. cit. no. 229: While the proof-of-work itself is difficult to produce, as it requires extensive sources of power and time, it is 
subsequently not demanding to verify its results by other computers. 
390 D. A Zetsche and coll., op. cit. no. 188, p. 12 „The number of nodes required for the consensus is set in the code underlying the system 
and is thus a fundamental aspect of the design of any system. This also provides one of the major known vulnerabilities in many blockchain 
systems, including Bitcoin. “ 
391 M. Swan, op. cit. no. 38, p. X. 





confirming and recording the transaction will depend on the computer’s previous transactions 
and its account balance in the blockchain’s cryptocurrency. Essentially, computers which 
have the most traffic (have analyzed and confirmed most transactions) in the past and thus, 
have been rewarded most of the distributed cryptocurrency, will be likely chosen to perform 
the recording successfully again, as they have more interest in well functioning of the 
system.393 Due to the fact that such method might lead to significant centralization where only 
few “mighty” computers will effectively perform all actions, more sophisticated protocols 
were developed which build on the relevance of the computers (their stake) but combine it 
with various mathematical methods of selection, including randomization. The biggest 
advantage of this method is that a lot less energy is necessary for the completion of the 
recording process. As the computers are not required to “waste” enormous computing power 
for problem solving and subsequent validation, this approach is considered as more energy 
efficient and economical (for the energy consumptions issues and consequences, please see 
section 4.6 of this thesis). For example, Peercoin protocol is based on the proof-of-stake 
method and Ethereum is supposed to introduce this method in the near future as well. 
 
Table 1 - Simple overview of main consensus protocols 
CONSENSUS PROTOCOL OVERVIEW 
Proof of Work Uses computational power to validate new blocks of data. 
To participate in this scheme, participants are required to collate 
transactions within single block and then apply a hash function with the 
use of some additional metadata. 
Proof of Stake Validators (special nodes) voting on valid blocks whilst posting collateral 
in order to be able to participate in the validation process. 
Unlike Proof of Work, Proof of Stake relies on proving the user is 
invested in the underlying token of value of the network being mined 
rather than being the owner of a large amount of computing power. 
Ripple Protocol In order to validate new transactions servers amalgamate outstanding 
                                                 
 





transactions into a “candidate list”. 
All participants then vote on valid transactions then be included in the 
ledger. 
Transactions that meet the 80 % threshold of “yes” votes are included 
within the following last closed ledger state. 
Proof of Elapsed Time As part of its Intelledger proposal, Intel has devised a means of 
establishing a validation lottery that takes advantage of the capability of 
its CPUs to produce a timestamp cryptographically signed by the 
hardware. 
Whoever in the chain has the next soonest timestamp will be the one to 
decide which transactions will be a part of the next block in the chain.  
This consensus method is extremely energy efficient compared to Proof of 
Work and therefore more adapted to IoT devices. 
 
Source: ENISA (2016), op. cit. no. 265, p. 10, own table processing 
 
After the hash is recorded in the ledger, it is permanent. Unless some unpredictable and 
unusual circumstances arise, such as a hacker attack, the data can never be amended or erased 
from the blockchain ledger. All other nodes in the network use the updated version of the 
blockchain for verification of new transactions which makes the ledger transparent. Later, 
when a stakeholder wishes to prove that the file has not been changed and therefore, is subject 
to the particular transaction recorded in the blockchain, it is sufficient to make a new 64-
character hash of the file and compare it with the one recorded in the ledger. If the code is 
exactly the same, the file has not been tempered with.  
2. Forks and Rule of the Longest Chain 
In terms of addition of new blocks to the chain of transactions, each node within the 
network follows the principle of the longest chain, meaning that the node verifying the 
transaction will always accept a new block which it considers as the continuation of the 
longest chain. Nonetheless, it is theoretically possible that two different transactions are 
completed at exactly same time which effectively leads to a split of the chain, also called a 
fork. This issue is resolved when another node within the network accepts and adds a new 





before it receives information that the chain was split). Therefore, upon this moment one split 
end becomes longer and all other nodes verifying the following transactions are bound by the 
longest chain rule and only add blocks to the one longer end of the chain. Blocks of 
transactions which are set aside and abandoned due to the split resolution are usually referred 
to as “orphan blocks”. Nodes whose blocks became orphan blocks eventually lose the right to 
a reward. The rate of forks and orphan blocks is regarded as one of factors for determination 
of the level of security of the whole network, as they often occur at the times of “double-
spend attacks”394 when the relevant node attempts to spend the same tokens of cryptocurrency 
twice, i.e. for two separate transactions. “A node can decide to broadcast a transaction in one 
block, and if the transaction value is high enough, it can try to broadcast another transaction 
spending the same Bitcoins in another block. To invalidate the first transaction, it needs to 
create a chain of blocks that is longer than the chain that already contains the first 
transaction. This in turn creates an increase in orphaned blocks independent of the success of 
the attack. Furthermore, a system that naturally has a high rate of orphan blocks is more 
vulnerable to double-spend attacks. This is due to the fact that a forked chain reduces the 
number of blocks that the attacker needs to create in order to invalidate one of its own 
transactions.” Such attacks are, however, immensely energy consuming.395  
On the other hand, some forks of the chain may be intentional and legitimate. The 
particular design of the ledger system and all its properties, including the requirements for 
consensus, are set up by a group of core code developers who de facto represent 
administrators of the system. They are constantly developing and improving the software, 
similar to internet applications. Each major update of the blockchain system (namely but not 
limited to cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin) is referred to as “hard fork” and all users are 
requested to download the latest version of the software396. Due to the fact that the majority of 
blockchain-based software is open source, the entire community of blockchain enthusiasts is 
allowed to participate in further improvement of the software. What’s more, each node may 
independently decide on the version of software (the particular fork) it supports and follows 
                                                 
 
394 For detailed description of double-spending please see M. Rosenfeld, ‘Analysis of hashrate-based double-spending’ (2012), Cornell 
University Library, available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.2009, last accessed 19.8.2018. 
395 H. Holmberg op. cit. no. 287, p. 313. 





which it signals to other nodes when connected to the network.397 Due to the fact that each 
upgrade of the network by way of a hard fork needs support of the majority, otherwise it is 
“doomed to fail”, this has been referred to as a de facto type of direct democracy.398 However, 
even though the core developers usually do take into account suggestions and complaints of 
individuals and entities, the decision-making regarding the development rests with them. This 
aspect of so-called “key personnel” can potentially have negative effects, in particular with 
respect to the security of the system399 (please see section 4.4.7 of this thesis). 
3. Cryptography 
Nonetheless, another piece of the puzzle is crucial for mainstream acceptance of 
blockchain and that is the encryption. The encryption ensures pseudonymization, i.e. 
separation of identifiers which are the data that identify or may identify a natural person. For 
these reasons, every person that opens an account with cryptocurrency and wants to perform a 
blockchain transaction is automatically assigned two pieces of information: (i) public key, or 
more precisely public address, and (ii) private key. Only the public key is registered in the 
ledger and unless the private key is leaked or openly connected to the public key by the 
particular person, no one can identify the concerned person (for more details regarding the 
encryption, please see Annex II. - Cryptocurrencies and Financial Services).  
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Annex II. - Cryptocurrencies and Financial Services 
For the sake of completeness, cryptocurrencies based on Bitcoin and Satoshi’s manual 
are usually called alt-coins (derived from the word alternative). Further, some authors 
differentiate between different alt-coins based on their inherent purpose.400 Firstly, alt-coins 
which have been designed for the same purposes as Bitcoin, that is to serve as a means of 
payment in a decentralized transaction system are referred to as pure alt-coins, or simply alt-
coins. Secondly, cryptocurrencies with focus on privacy can be referred to as anonymous 
coins and thirdly, cryptocurrencies which only use blockchain transaction systems as an 
underlying layer which they build on for additional purposes can be referred as Appcoins.  
Although the Bitcoin is not the first digital currency project in history, the Satoshi’s 
paper presents a first solution to the above mentioned Byzantine General’s Problem by 
creating a decentralized network which does not require trust towards an intermediary. 
Furthermore, it solves the previously unsolvable Double-Spend Problem. “Until blockchain 
cryptography, digital cash was, like any other digital asset, infinitely copiable (like our ability 
to save an email attachment any number of times), and there was no way to confirm that a 
certain batch of digital cash had not already been spent without a central intermediary.”401 It 
follows that an intermediary was not only necessary to establish trust between the involved 
parties but also to prevent fraudulent activities consisting in transferring the digital cash 
intended for the payment several times to several individuals. 
For ensuring that one token of digital currency is not used twice at the same time 
Satoshi combines the BitTorent protocol for peer-to-peer file sharing and encryption 
technology based on unique private key solely known and available to the users 
themselves.402 What should be emphasized is that no special account needs to be opened in 
order to be able to participate in a decentralized transaction system, such as the Bitcoin. Every 
user is given a public address which serves as an identificator of the particular person when 
another person sends them digital money. In the traditional transaction system the public 
address corresponds to the bank account number. For example in the Bitcoin system, the 
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public address is composed of 26 to 34 alphanumeric characters, such as 
1JDQ5KSqUTBo5M3GUPx8vm9134eJRosLoH which can also have the form of a QR 
code.403 It is practically impossible that two individuals are generated the same public 
address.404  
On the other hand, the private key paired to the public address represents a secret code, 
which is never given away by the user and its sole purpose is identification of the user, i.e. to 
assign the particular digital cash balance to the particular person. The private key is usually a 
256-bit number and is even longer than the public address shown above as an example.405 
Without the private key the user cannot access its digital finances and cannot proceed with 
transacting a sum to another person’s public address.406  
In addition to this information, a person must have a computer and internet access to 
either become a full node within the network or to use SPV software relying on other nodes; 
nothing else is necessary for a blockchain transaction. Nevertheless, the private key represents 
an extremely sensitive piece of information – there is “no customer service number to call for 
password recovery or private key backup”407. If it is lost, there is no way it can be recovered, 
and thus, all digital cash is lost as well. As a consequence, other software has been developed 
to ensure safe-keeping of private keys. This software is usually referred to as eWallet408 and 
apart from the public address and private key, it may also include a part of the blockchain 
database relating to the user’s past transactions, similar to a statement of account. One 
eWallet may keep access information to more than one transaction system and more than one 
cryptocurrency. Examples of eWallets include ChromaWallet, Counterwallet or OneWallet. 
The eWallets also help to make the blockchain system more user-friendly, as instead of 
                                                 
 
403 Ibid, p. 97. 
404 Ibid, pp 98-99: Upon registration, the pair of public and private key is generated first, on the basis of the current standard which is the 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Additional steps are taken for the public address to be generated. Essentially the public key is 
transformed into a shorter format with assistance of encryption protocols like SHA-256 and RIPEMD-160. While it is technically possible 
that the same public address is generated for two separate individuals, the odds of such possibility are less than 0,0001 %. Furthermore, 
potential derivation of the private key based on the public key or public address would be either impossible (one-way hashing operation) or 
would require extreme computing power and thus, would be extremely expensive. 
405 Ibid, p. 99. 







remembering the complicated public address and private keys numbers, a person can set up a 
personalized, sufficiently safe password. However, as shown in section 4.4.4 of this thesis, 
they can also represent concentration and centralization to a certain degree which may 
consequently result in formation of new “honeypots” – hackers’ targets.  
In regard to mainstream acceptance of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies, a vendor 
wishing to accept cryptocurrencies must dispose with a particular payment processing 
solution (as it is not reasonable to expect usual consumers to pay for a cup of coffee via 
Internet). In the traditional sense of payment this solution corresponds to a credit card 
terminal, as an interface capable of reading the customer’s public address and interacting with 
his eWallet.409. Some of the most common merchant solutions include BitPay and Coinbase in 
the United States. Coinbase has also recently started to provide an eShop, i.e. eCommerce, 
solution for integration of Coinbase payment option in the checkout process410. In Europe, e.g. 
BitcoinPay enables operation with many traditional currencies, including CZK. Another 
solution, CoinGate also offers mobile processing of payments.411  
While it is definitely useful that the above mentioned payment processing solutions 
provide for immediate exchange of Bitcoins into traditional currency, such as euros, for most 
small businesses it will probably rather pose an obstacle than a convenience to install 
additional forms of payments, even more so if we take into account the current instability of 
the majority of virtual currencies (for more details on the issue if instability of altcoins, please 
see section 4.8 of this thesis). For these reasons, one of the foremost areas of focus for future 
development might be providing a solution capable of combining traditional and decentralized 
payment processing solutions.412 Among first steps in this direction is BitPay VISA Prepaid 
                                                 
 
409 As follows from the Bitcoin’s official website, “some Bitcoin merchant solutions also provide invoices and easy to use Point-Of-Sale 
(POS) applications that run on a smart phone or tablet. Many merchant processors instantly convert the Bitcoin payment to your local 
currency at the current exchange rate. There are also a number of stand-alone tools available online for merchants to identify the current 
conversion rate quickly if needed“. Please see ‘Merchant Solutions’, available at: https://www.bitcoin.com/merchant-solutions/, last accessed 
19.8.2018, for further description and list of merchant solutions.  
410 Please see L. Shen, ‘Meet ‘Paypal for Crypto,’ a New Way to Pay With Bitcoin and Litecoin’ (2018), available at: 
http://fortune.com/2018/02/15/bitcoin-paypal-coinbase-commerce/, last accessed 19.8.2018 and ‘Coinbase Commerce –the Easiest Way for 
Merchants to Accept Digital Currency’ [2018], available at: https://medium.com/@coinbasecommerce/coinbase-commerce-the-easiest-way-
for-merchants-to-accept-digital-currency-54ba64966f8d, last accessed 19.8.2018.  
411 In respect of mobile processing by way of an application for iOS or Android, some of the most common, apart from CoinGate, are 
European XBTerminal and Coinify. 





Card project which enables the consumer to pay in Bitcoins at every vendor place accepting 
VISA credit and debit cards.413 This solution definitely represents one of the first steps of 
“rapprochement” of traditional and decentralized payment systems.  
With respect to purchase of Bitcoins, the Bitcoin’s official website provides a list of 
“places to buy Bitcoin in exchange for other currencies”. Some of the prominent international 
exchanges include Kraken or Bitstamp while others, such as BitPanda or BL3P are focused on 
the European market.414  
While not technically an exchange, Bitcoin trading places, such as Coinbase, provide 
exchange services as well. Their customers can buy and sell Bitcoins and other virtual 
currencies. For these purposes Coinbase has enabled transferring of funds via credit and debit 
cards and even PayPal415, however only within the US market. PayPal, with more than 227 
million active users416, was prohibiting usage of their payment processing services for the 
purposes of de facto exchange operation in the past, however they have since then changed 
their stance and are now cooperating with Coinbase so that the users of Coinbase can now sell 
Bitcoin and receive payments via their PayPal accounts.417 PayPal has even acquired a 
subsidiary Braintree for the purpose of enabling their users to pay for Uber rides or Airbnb 
rentals with Bitcoin.418 As of March 2018, there have been reports that the company even 
filed for a patent with the US patent office with the objective of speeding up the decentralized 
transaction processing time.419 The long processing time of transactions remains an obstacle 
                                                 
 
413 However, the BitPay card itself does not process the payment in Bitcoins. It is a two-step process. Firstly, the BitPay card is directly 
connected to the individual’s BitPay eWallet and can be “loaded” with Bitcoins via said eWallet. However, it can also be loaded with US 
dollars. Secondly, the payment is made in US dollars. All Bitcoins which were transferred to the BitPay Card are exchanged to US dollars 
under current exchange rate. The balance is subsequently always kept in US dollars and the consumer is free to use the card like a usual 
payment card or even withdraw US dollars in cash from an ATM machine. For further information on BitPay Visa Prepaid Card please see: 
‘Load dollars using your Bitcoin wallet, spend anywhere’, available at: https://bitpay.com/card/, last accessed 19.8.2018.  
414 Please see ‘Bitcoin exchanges’, available at: https://bitcoin.org/en/exchanges, last accessed 19.8.2018.  
415 Please see ‘Coinbase adds support for PayPal and Credit Cards’ (2016), available at: https://blog.coinbase.com/coinbase-adds-support-
for-paypal-and-credit-cards-21968661d508, last accessed 19.8.2018.  
416 Numbers for 2017, reports from ‘PayPal Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017 Results’ (2018), https://investor.paypal-
corp.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=1055924, last accessed 19.8.2018.  
417 Please see I. Kar, ‘PayPal is warming up to bitcoin’ (2016), available at: https://qz.com/713528/paypal-is-warming-up-to-bitcoin/, last 
accessed 19.8.2018.  
418 M. Swan, op. cit. no. 38, p. 11.  
419 Please see J. Wilmoth, ‘PayPal Files Patent to Improve Cryptocurrency Transaction Times’ (2018), available at: 





to mainstream acceptance and use of cryptocurrencies, for more details please see section 4.5 








Annex III. – Ripple 
Bitcoin is not the only representative of cryptocurrencies. In order to describe the 
differences between centralized and decentralized transaction systems, this section will briefly 
focus on Ripple (i.e. Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm) as a representative of semi-
centralized transaction systems420.  
Ripple shares some basic features and setting with Bitcoin. It is also based on a 
decentralized ledger, public and private keys and very similar encryption. However, a node 
does not have to download the whole content of the ledger. Ripple tries to prevent “bloating” 
and capacity issues by implementing two ledgers – one contains all transactions in Ripple 
currency (XRP), similarly to Bitcoin (referred to as “state tree”), the other, however, contains 
only most recent transactions confirmed by the network (called “transaction tree”). 
In 2004, when the Ripple system was first presented, it had yet not acquired features of 
blockchains as per Bitcoin’s design and was essentially based on limited trust. Each node had 
to trust at least one other node which then had its own mini network of trusted nodes 
(frequently compared to Facebook friends network). Transactions were then processed even 
between complete strangers connected by chain of “friends”. The currency was created as 
corresponding to debts resulting from nodes’ interaction.421 Nonetheless, the system did not 
grow as expected and in 2012 the network got “blockchainized”. As a result, users can chose 
from two ways of transaction processing: either they know the sender and thus can transact 
directly, or they do not know or trust the sender and use a gateway. Gateways, while not 
necessary required, are usually exchanges/trading places which have earned the trust of the 
network and ensure safe processing.  
The most interesting part is that Ripple does not require mining because the consensus 
is not reached by a proof. Instead each node in the network has a list of trusted nodes “that 
are not likely to collude against them” which is called a UNL (“unique node list”). A 
consensus is reached by voting – nodes compare the latest version of the ledger and then vote 
which transaction was received soonest, which is true etc. Due to the fact that nodes vote only 
                                                 
 
420 The description of the Ripple network is primarily based on V. Buterin, ‘Introducing Ripple: A Detailed Look at Cryptocurrency's New 
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when one of their UNL nodes is involved, the majority (80 %422) and consensus are reached 
very quickly, in a matter of few seconds. This gives Ripple a major edge over Bitcoin and 
other similar systems – validation of transactions is a lot more energy efficient. From another 
point of view, there might also be certain consequences. For instance, as Ripple does not need 
mining and does not provide incentives, its total supply of XRP 100 billion is owned by the 
founder and will be slowly distributed firstly among users and then among the general public, 
probably on the basis of auction.423 This entails significant deflationary effect.424 Also, while 
Ripple is well adapted for currency exchange services425 and payment services and 
cooperation with financial institutions, such as the example of Fidor Bank in Germany, as the 
network imposes a minimal transaction value threshold (XRP 50, for creation of address XRP 
200), the system is not suitable for micropayments, e.g. in connection with IoT. This only 
proves the vast versatility of the blockchain technology and the fact that not every blockchain 
is the same. 
  
                                                 
 
422 A. M. Puertas, R. Teigland, op. cit. no. 101, p. 286. 
423 Ibid, p. 286: “As of 2017, Ripple has sold XRP 40billion. In May 2017, Ripple announced that they would place XRP 55 billion in an 
escrow account with a precise schedule to eliminate the fear of an unexpected shock in the money supply. The escrow account contains 55 
contracts of XRP 1 billion that expire on the first day of every month. The amount that is not sold is returned to the escrow account and 
offered after the original 55 contracts have expired.” 
424 V. Buterin, op. cit. no. 410: “Unlike BTC, where the total number of currency units in existence increases more and more slowly with 
every passing year until eventually stabilizing at a permanent 21 million in 2140, the number of XRP starts off at an all-time maximum of 
100 billion and then immediately starts permanently decreasing as transaction fees are paid.” 





Annex IV. – Ethereum 
Ethereum is based on a blockchain ledger which works similarly to the one of Bitcoin 
with the rule of the longest chain and currently deployed proof-of-work mechanism for 
confirmation of transactions and creation of blocks. It might be worth to mention that 
Ethereum is planning to switch to proof-of-stake with its upgrade called Casper.426 Ethereum 
ensures adoption of new confirmation mechanism by making the proof-of-work exponentially 
more difficult, until it becomes virtually impossible.427 The miners are rewarded in Ether 
which is the platform’s currency, also similarly to Bitcoin. But that is where the similarities 
end.  
Firstly, transaction fees are not just based on the size of a block. Ethereum comes up 
with a more sophisticated solution, in order to mitigate or make up for the amounts of 
computational energy that are wasted for the proof-of-work mechanism. In particular, users 
have to pay for that energy upfront by way of a fee called gas. Gas is like a fuel for processing 
of the transaction and is paid in Ether. Due to the fact that Ethereum is primarily intended for 
self-executing contracts, the more complicated the execution of contract, the more gas is 
needed during its life-cycle. If a smart contract runs out of gas, the contract is not executed. 
On the other hand, if some amount of gas is left after all actions in a smart contract have been 
completed the rest is given back to the originator of the transaction. This is why gas has also 
been referred to as execution fee.428 Furthermore, the amount of gas can also affect the speed 
of processing, namely, if the transaction fees are higher, the likelihood that it will be picked 
up by one of the miners is higher as well.429  
Secondly, the processing time in Ethereum can be measured in seconds, i.e. the 
problems which miners have to solve are not as difficult as in Bitcoin.430 This raises doubts in 
relation to orphan blocks and double-spend attacks. The higher orphan rates were resolved by 
                                                 
 
426 I. Bashir, op. cit. no. 157, p. 249: “An Algorithm named Casper has been developed, which will replace the existing Proof of Work in 
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produce blocks. Nodes have been named bonded validators in Casper, whereas the act of placing the security deposit is named bonding.” 
427 Ibid, p. 244 
428 Ibid, pp 214-245. 
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implementation of stale blocks which are added to calculations to ensure that longest chains 
are the true ones.431 
Thirdly, due to Ethereum’s focus on smart contracts, the network has two kinds of 
accounts: (i) so-called externally owned accounts which can only send transactions, similarly 
to Bitcoin, and cannot execute a code of smart contract, and (ii) contract accounts which can 
execute smart contracts. However, the distinction should be removed in the near future and all 
accounts should be enabled to execute smart contracts.432 
Fourthly, it uses a Turing-complete protocol on top of the blockchain layer. Turing-
completeness refers to an “ability to run any coin, protocol, or blockchain”433 and is ensured 
by Ehtereum’s programming language called Solidity which has been often compared to 
JavaScript, the basis of many applications, such as Gmail or Facebook.434 The language is 
stack-based, not binary like Bitcoin which is what enables creation and execution of smart 
contracts, as it enables unlimited number of contract stages. “With Bitcoin, the transactions 
are binary – the Bitcoins are either spent or not spent. With Ethereum, the contract does not 
have to be fulfilled or not fulfilled, but can be in stage one pre-negotiation, stage two offer, 
etc.”435 Another thing which makes Solidity well-suited for smart contracts is that it is 
contract-oriented (as opposed to object-oriented) which enables it to understand “concepts 
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List of Abbreviations 
AIFMD Alternative investment fund managers directive 
AML Anti-money laundering 
AMLD Anti-money laundering directive 
BTC Bitcoin cryptocurrency 
CEO Chief executive officer 
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Blockchain na evropské úrovni 
Abstrakt 
Cílem této diplomové práce je poskytnout základní přehled technologie blockchain, 
jejích vlastností a potenciálního využití, včetně přehledu evropských předpisů, které se této 
technologie mohou za určitých podmínek dotýkát. V první kapitole diplomová práce 
poskytuje právní rámec primárního práva EU, který zakládá nebo může založit pravomoc EU 
zabývat se technologií blockchain, v závislosti na její právní kvalifikaci (zejména 
v souvislosti s vnitřním trhem – zejména volný pohyb služeb či kapitálu).  
V druhé a třetí kapitole je uveden základní popis funkcionalit blockchainu a kryptoměn 
a souvisejících služeb. Detailní popis je poskytnut v přílohách I-IV této diplomové práce. 
Zároveň je posouzen právní status a regulace kryptoměn, které tvoří základ technologií 
založených na blockchainu, a to jak na evropské úrovni, tak na úrovni členských států a 
dalších světových jurisdikcí. Součástí posouzení je i nedávný rozsudek SDEU Hedqvist, dle 
kterého se na dvousměrné směnárenské služby (nákup kryptoměn za fiat měny a naopak) 
uplatní výjimka z povinnosti odvést DPH v souladu s VAT směrnicí. Vzhledem k odůvodnění 
SDEU i generálního advokáta může tento rozsudek v budoucnu významně ovlivnit vývoj 
interpretace právního statusu kryptoměn a blockchainu obecně. Kromě kryptoměn je rovněž 
provedena analýza smart contracts, včetně potenciálních problémů, které mohou  z právního 
hlediska nastat. Tyto se budou týkat zejména procesních otázek.  
Ve čtvrté kapitole je posouzeno deset nejvýznamějších a nejzajímavějších aspektů 
technologie blockchain, které mohou jednak představovat přínosy a výhody, které tato 
technologie může za určitých okolností přinést, ale také potenciální komplikace nebo slabá 
místa, která bude třeba vyřešit, aby se vůbec mohlo uvažovat o implementaci této technologie 
do každodenních procesů podniků i obyčejné populace. 
 
Klíčová slova: blockchain, kryptoměny, platební služby, vnitřní trh, měna, zákonné 






Blockchain at the European Level 
Abstract 
The objective of this master thesis is to provide a basic overview of the blockchain 
technology, its features and its potential utilization, including an overview of European legal 
regulations that might be applicable to the technology, under certain conditions. In the first 
chapter, the master’s thesis sets forth the legal framework of the EU primary law that 
establishes or can establish the EU’s competence to act in the matters of blockchain 
technology, depending on its legal qualification (especially in the context of the internal 
market – namely the free movement of services and capital).  
The second and third chapters provide essential description of features of blockchain 
and cryptocurrency and related services. A more detailed description is provided in Annexes 
I-IV of this thesis. Further, the legal status and applicable regulation of cryptocurrencies are 
assessed at the European and national levels and in terms of other global jurisdictions. The 
assessment also includes the recent CJEU’s judgment in the case Hedqvist, according to 
which bidirectional exchange services (purchase of cryptocurrency for fiat currency and vice 
versa) are to be exempted from VAT obligation under the VAT directive. In line with the 
CJEU’s reasoning and the Advocate General’s opinion, this judgment may significantly affect 
the future development of the interpretation of legal status of cryptocurrencies and blockchain 
in general. Apart from cryptocurrencies, an analysis of smart contracts, including potential 
issues which might occur from the legal point of view, is provided as well. In particular, these 
issues will concern the procedural legal questions. 
The fourth chapter lays down ten most significant and interesting aspects of the 
blockchain technology which, under certain circumstances, can be considered as beneficial 
and advantageous, however, some can also represent potential complications or weak spots 
that need to be addressed to enable widespread implementation of the technology in the day-
to-day processed of businesses and general population to even be considered. 
 
Key Words: blockchain, cryptocurrency, payment services, internal market, currency, 
legal tender, smart contracts, Bitcoin, Ethereum, Hedqvist 
